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Joint expeditionary logistics operations are required in Sea Basing.  Forcible entry 
operations are initiated and sustained from ships operating as a sea base until the 
operation is successfully concluded or until heavier joint forces arrive at the ports and 
airfields secured by the forcible entry operations.  This is very different from traditional 
ground combat operations initiated from and sustained by bases ashore;  
e.g., Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
 
Sea Basing expeditionary maneuver forces for combat operations ashore involves  
1) closing troops from CONUS to the sea base, 2) force assembly at the sea base,  
3) deployment of forces from the sea base to objectives ashore, and 4) sustainment of the 
forces ashore and ships of the sea base.  These fundamental operations can be performed 
in a variety of ways. 
 
The sea base consists of one or more carrier strike groups (CSGs), one or more 
expeditionary strike groups (ESGs), combat logistics force ships, and maritime 
preposition force (future) (MPF(F)) ships.  The unit equipment and combat stores of the 
maneuver forces are prepositioned forward on the MPF(F) ships.  Troops (and  
non-self-deploying aircraft) from CONUS must close to the MPF(F) ships.  In closing 
troops and in sustainment there is the notion of an advance base whose availability is 
assured, but may be up to 2,000 nm from the sea base.  If large, fixed-wing transport 
aircraft cannot land on ships at sea, troops may need to be transported to the advance base 
as an intermediate step in closing to the sea base.  Troops could be transported from 
CONUS to the advance base either by aircraft or by ships.  Whereas aircraft cannot 
proceed directly to the sea base, ships from CONUS could steam either to the advance 
base or to the sea base.  The MPF(F) ships could steam directly from their preposition 
site to the sea base or to the advance base. 
 
If the troops are transported from CONUS to the advance base by aircraft and the 
MPF(F) ships do not call at the advance base to onload them, a connector vessel must 
transport them from the advance base to the MPF(F) ships.  If the troops are transported 
from CONUS to the advance base in rapid strategic lift ships (RSLS) and the MPF(F) do 
not call at the advance base, a connector is again needed to take the troops from the 
advance base to the MPF(F) ships.  Alternatively, the RSLS could transport the troops 
from CONUS to the MPF(F).  The troops could transfer to the MPF(F) ships either at the 
sea base or while the MPF(F) and connector or RSLS are en route to the sea base, if this 
is feasible.  An option that eliminates the need to transfer troops between ships in open 
ocean is to have the MPF(F) ships call at the advance base and onload troops at the pier.  




Clearly there are a variety of ways of closing troops to the sea base.  Sea Basing 
capability requires new preposition ships and possibly RSLSs and/or  
high-speed connectors (HSC).  Analysis is required to choose between the various 
alternatives and the platforms that enable them.  One measure of performance of any 
alternative is the time it takes to close troops to the sea base or the time it takes to close to 
the sea base and deploy to objectives ashore. 
 
JELO is an expected value Excel spreadsheet-based model that represents a number of 
closure alternatives, transfer, deployment, and sustainment.  Most of the flows and rates 
are treated as parameters characterized only by their expected values.  Whether the flow 
is the transfer rate of personnel from a HSC to a MPF(F) ship or the rate is the 
consumption of ammunition by forces ashore, only deterministic planning factors are 
available for current operations and systems and only goals are available for future 
systems.  Analysis more sophisticated than expected value analysis requires treating 
many of these parameters as random variables and requires specification of the mean, 
variance, and distribution of the parameters.  Such data is generally unavailable for 
current, as well as future, capabilities and systems. 
 
The model is transparent, clearly indicating its structure and logic.  It is not practical to 
build a completely general model that encompasses all the alternatives.  An analyst 
familiar with JELO can build on the basic structure to represent any operations of 
interest.  The goal has been to create a useful tool for examining and evaluating various 
sea basing architectures.  Examples are shown only to demonstrate use of the model. 
 
The Navy and Marine Corps are currently defining the MPF(F).  Additionally, there are 
potentially other platforms to build in order to make Sea Basing a reality— 
high-speed connectors, assault connectors, and rapid strategic lift ships.  The goal has 
been to develop a model that the OPNAV staff can use to provide insight about  




While ground combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Spring of 2003 were 
very successful, a pause in the fighting was called on about the 29th of March—eight or 
nine days after the operation began—because the 3rd Infantry Division and the  
1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) forces were low on MREs, fuel, and 
ammunition.  These units were being resupplied through the movement of these 
commodities over the ground from depots also on the ground in Kuwait.  In Sea Basing, 
forces will arrive to ships of a sea base, assemble with their equipment and stores at sea, 
deploy from ships of the sea base to objective areas ashore and conduct combat 
operations.  Their resupply will flow from ships of the sea base.  As difficult as it was to 
deploy and resupply forces in Iraq from bases and depots ashore, sea basing such 
operations will be much more difficult and require a system of systems consisting of 
preposition ships, high-speed sealift ships, high-speed connector vessels, the means to 
transfer troops, equipment, stores between platforms in open ocean, and air and surface 
connectors for deploying and resupplying the forces. 
 
Figure 1 depicts one of a large number of ways of closing troops and non-self-deployed 
aircraft to the sea base, specifically to the MPF(F) ships.  Only the MPF(F) ships in the 
sea base have the maneuver force unit equipment and stores and can accommodate the 
troops on-board.  Unless the MPF(F) call at the advance base, a transfer is required to 
move the troops and cargo to the MPF(F) ships.  The figure also reflects the deployment 
of the maneuver forces to objectives ashore from the MPF(F) ships after their arrival and 
assembly.  There is another transfer operation in which the troops and their equipment 
and stores are loaded from the MPF(F) to connectors that take them from the sea base to 
objective areas ashore.  These connectors may be aircraft or surface craft.  Finally, the 
figure indicates resupply of the forces ashore and of the ships of the sea base including 
not only the MPF(F), but the ships of associated carrier strike groups (CSG) and 
expeditionary strike groups (ESG) as well. 
 
The focus here is on flowing forces to, and subsequently deploying from, the MPF(F).  
ESG operations are not modeled though the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) battalion 
landing team could be part of the operations. 
 
A common definition of military logistics is that it is the set of activities concerned with 
the establishment, maintenance, and movement of forces.  It follows then that 
expeditionary logistics operations encompassing the closure of troops to the sea base, the 
assembly of force units, the deployment of these forces to objectives ashore, and the 
resupply of all concerned—forces and ships—should be described as Joint Expeditionary 




Figure 1.  Expeditionary Logistics Operations 
 
2. Assumptions, Data, Planning Factors, and Uncertainties 
 
The first assumption is really about the scenario reflected in the model.  It includes the 
flow of an MPF(F) Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to MPF(F) ships at a sea base.  
The MPF(F) MEB troops that flow to the sea base are the Seabased Maneuver Element 
(SBME) and the Seabased Support Element (SBSE), plus a Naval Support Element 
(NSE).  The SBME and some direct support from the SBSE are subsequently deployed 
from the MPF(F) ships to objective areas ashore.  The SBME consists of three reinforced 
infantry battalions of which one is intended for vertical deployment and two are to be 
deployed on the surface.  The Vertical battalion is to be lifted 110 nm to an objective 
inland and the Surface battalions will be carried 25 nm to the shore with the beach as 
their initial objective. 
 
There are several ways to move the troops of the SBME, SBSE, and NSE from CONUS 
to the sea base and a few of these are described in Section 5.  Aircraft will not be 
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prepositioned on the MPF(F) and non self-deploying aircraft will have to be airlifted into 
the theater.  The tiltrotor aircraft will self-deploy.  LCACs and EFVs will be 
prepositioned on the MPF(F) ships.  An advance base may be used in the flow of forces 
to the sea base.  The advance base must be a facility with an airport and a seaport, and 
controlled by the United States through ownership or treaty.  While we probably know 
where the MPF(F) squadrons will be prepositioned, we don’t know where the sea base 
will be required and what advance base will be utilized.  Troops flown to the advance 
base may be transshipped by high-speed connector (HSC) vessels from the advance base 
to the sea base.  The capabilities of the HSC are unknown and it is not yet a program of 
record.  All we know about it is that the Initial Capabilities Document for a High Speed 
Connector [2] states that they will reside in the numbered fleets and be forward deployed 
in the geographical combatant commander’s areas of responsibility in order to provide 
responsive support to the Combatant and Joint Force Commanders.  In order to include 
the HSC in this modeling, some assumptions have to be made about the numbers of such 
vessels and their speed, range, and capacities for transporting troops, cargo, and aircraft. 
 
Once the HSCs arrive at the sea base or earlier, their troops must be transferred to the 
MPF(F) ships.  All Concept of Operations (CONOPS) documents note the requirement 
for such transfer capabilities, but none say how this capability is achieved and this 
requires assumptions for modeling purposes.  An alternative way of flowing maneuver 
forces to the sea base is for them to embark rapid strategic lift ships (RSLS) in CONUS 
and sail to the advance base or directly to the sea base.  Again, such high-speed shipping 
is not a program of record and one has only available PowerPoint briefings that bracket 
achievable speeds and ranges without commenting on capacities, aircraft operational 
spots, etc. 
 
Perhaps the largest assumptions involve the MPF(F) itself because it is so central to  
sea basing.  While the Analysis of Alternatives has been completed [3], there are a 
number of ship and squadron alternatives, and no doubt more alternatives yet to come.  
Though a program of record, the MPF(F) ship’s basic characteristics (things like speed, 
number of aircraft operating spots, number and type of surface connector loading points, 
etc.) are as yet undetermined.  Again, for modeling purposes, assumptions have to be 
made.  The assumption is that there are eight like ships in the MPF(F) squadron, all with 
a single aircraft operating spot and single surface connector load point.  From [3], the 
distributed capability designs have four or five aircraft operating spots per ship, while the 
specialized ship designs have one or two aircraft operating spots per ship.  MPF(F) ship 
speed, number of spots, and surface craft load points in a squadron are treated as 
parameters and the JELO user can input the numbers or range of numbers of interest. 
 
The maneuver forces on the MPF(F) are deployed ashore to conduct a forcible entry 
operation in which they will use combat stores at assault rates for the first five days and 
at sustained rates for another 15 days.  The MPF(F) is to have stores for 20 days of 
operations [3].  If the 20 days of supply is in terms of the full MEB, stores on the MPF(F) 
will support just the SBME, SBSE, and NSE for even longer.  The assumption is that 
either the operation achieved all objectives and is ended or that by the 20th day joint 
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heavy forces arrived in number through the air and sea ports secured in the forcible  
entry operation. 
 
Data—hard data—exists for very little of the overall problem.  There is operational or 
test data available for the LCAC and the MV-22.  It cannot be known from the available 
literature whether the EFV speed on water should be assumed to be 20 kts or the  
long-advertised 25 kts.  It is known that sea state affects the LCAC’s speed and payload 
and that it cannot operate at all above sea state 4 [4].  What the mission-capable rates of 
the various connectors will be over time are not known, though there is an estimate for 
the LCAC [4] and other studies have made assumptions about the MV-22 and CH-53E 
mission-capable rates in sustained operations. 
 
OPNAV N42 and Fleet Forces Command are compiling logistics planning factors from a 
number of sources and selecting and documenting approved numbers [5].  If all analyses 
use the same inputs, comparing the results should be possible. 
 
These considerations apply as well to Marine maneuver forces.  The 2015 MPF(F) MEB 
is different in numbers, kinds of units, and table of equipment from the Marine Corps 
Bulletin 3501 MEB.  The published logistics planning factors for the consumption of fuel 
and ammo are based on the MCB 3501 MEB or even earlier versions.  Logistics planning 
factors for the 2015 MEB have yet to be published. 
 
The methodology adopted for estimating SBME daily fuel and ammo requirements is to 
take the existing planning factors and the existing table of organization personnel 
numbers for each type of unit (infantry battalion, artillery battery, LAV company, etc.) 
and compute the commodity use planning factor in terms of pounds or gallons per Marine 
per day.  These factors are then applied to the SBME table of organization for each of the 
three reinforced infantry battalions and their direct support personnel.  This methodology 
produces smaller daily requirements for fuel and ammo than most of the numbers in the 
literature, but are perhaps consistent with the changes being made by the Marine Corps to 
sea base smaller, lighter maneuver forces. 
 
3. The Maneuver Force 
 
The maneuver force modeled is the 2015 MPF(F) Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 
[1].  While the 2015 MEB is always 14,484 troops, whether it is an amphibious MEB or 
an MPF(F) MEB, the MPF(F) MEB consists of a Seabased Echelon of 8,062 troops plus 
a Naval Support Element and only the Seabased Echelon is flowed to the sea base.  The 
Seabased Echelon consists of the Seabased Maneuver Element (SBME) and the  
Seabased Support Element (SBSE).  Most of the SBSE and all of the NSE stays aboard 
the MPF(F).  The Assault Element/Direct Support CSS that is deployed ashore is 
composed of a reinforced battalion-sized maneuver element configured for vertical lift 
and two reinforced battalion-sized maneuver elements configured for surface lift.  The 
battalion to be vertically deployed consists of 1,164 troops whose major equipment 
includes 28 LAVs, 8 EFSS, and 143 HMMWV variants.  The battalions to be surface 
deployed each consist of 1,840 troops with 53 EFVs, 14 M1A1 tanks, 28 LAVs,  
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6 LW155 artillery pieces, 6 HIMARSs, 157 HMMWV variants, 45 MTVRs, and  
18 LVSs.  The unit equipment and most of the supporting combat stores are 
prepositioned on the MPF(F) ships. 
 
4. The Maritime Preposition Force (Future) 
 
The requirements of MPF(F) have been examined in detail and a number of alternative 
designs were presented in the MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives [3].  Still, the  
Navy Research Advisory Committee, in its report on Sea Basing to ASN (RD&A) on  
5 August 2004, said the “MPF(F) vision is unclear, there are too many unknowns, and it 
is not ready to build.”  This is reflected by the fact that construction was delayed from 
2007 to 2009.  However, in order to proceed with modeling, some assumptions about the 
MPF(F) are necessary. 
 
It will be assumed that the MPF(F) squadron will consist of identical (distributed) ships.  
This will avoid what the Marines call a “single point of failure.”  The number of such 
ships in the squadron need not be explicitly specified.  Instead, the user specified input 
parameter is the number of aircraft spots in the squadron and the number of surface 
connector loading points in the squadron.  Ship speed is also a user specified input 
parameter.  It is assumed that the squadron of MPF(F) ships can accommodate at least 
8,500 troops collectively.  Also implicit is that the design of the MPF(F) is such that it 
collectively can carry all the needed unit equipment for the MEB, 20 days’ supply of all 
stores including fuel and ammunition, has assembly areas of sufficient size, and has 
selective offload capability.  Further assumptions are that the MPF(F) ships will 
collectively have 16-20 LCACs, 48 MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft, and 20 CH-53X heavy-lift 
helicopters [3].  The LCACs will be prepositioned on the MPF(F) ships, but the aircraft 
will have to deploy to the MPF(F).  The MV-22s will self-deploy and the  
non-self-deploying CH-53X and AH/UH helos will be transported to the sea base [3].  
The LCAC is the surface connector because there is no other surface connector likely to 
be available in 2015.  The LCAC is characterized by its speed as a function of sea state, 
range, and transport capabilities (vehicle and troop capacities, loading and unloading 
times).  Connectors that might be available in 2020 or 2025 can be incorporated by 
changing the characteristics of the deployment connector. 
 
The question of where the connectors (air and surface) are on C-day is critical.  The 
aircraft are not prepositioned and must self-deploy or be transported to the sea base [3].  
If HSC vessels are utilized, the assumption is that they were forward deployed with the 
numbered fleets and thus available in theater [2].  The LCAC is the other major connector 
and [3] speaks of it being organic to the MPF(F) and indeed it’s cost is included in the sea 
base total ownership cost. 
 
5. Closing Forces to the Sea Base 
 
There are many possibilities for closing forces to the sea base.  Troops (and  
non-self-deploying aircraft (NSDA)) from CONUS must close to the MPF(F) ships of the 
sea base.  In closing troops and in sustainment there is the notion of an advance base 
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whose availability is assured, but may be up to 2,000 nm from the sea base.  If large, 
fixed-wing transport aircraft cannot land on ships at sea, troops need to be transported to 
the advance base as an intermediate step in closing to the sea base.  Troops could be 
transported from CONUS to the advance base either by aircraft or by ships.  Whereas 
aircraft cannot proceed directly to the sea base, ships from CONUS could steam either to 
the advance base or to the sea base.  The MPF(F) ships could steam directly from their 
preposition site to the sea base or to the advance base. 
 
If the troops are transported from CONUS to the advance base by aircraft and the 
MPF(F) ships do not call at the advance base to onload them, a connector vessel must 
transport them from the advance base to the MPF(F) ships.  If the troops are transported 
from CONUS to the advance base in rapid strategic lift ships (RSLS) and the MPF(F) do 
not call at the advance base, a connector is again needed to take the troops from the 
advance base to the MPF(F) ships.  Alternatively, the RSLS could transport the troops 
from CONUS to the MPF(F).  The troops could transfer to the MPF(F) ships either at the 
sea base or while the MPF(F) and connector or RSLS are en route to the sea base, if this 
is feasible.  An option that eliminates the need to transfer troops between ships in open 
ocean, is to have the MPF(F) ships call at the advance base and onload troops at the pier.  
A convenient scenario may be that the advance base is the port where the MPF(F) ships 
are prepositioned. 
 
NSDA must also be considered.  The NSDA will include the heavy-lift helicopters  
(CH-53X) and the tactical helicopters (AH-1 and UH-1).  If carried from CONUS to the 
advance base in cargo aircraft (C-17), they must be partially disassembled prior to 
loading and then reassembled and flight checks performed prior to being operational.  
These things add considerable time to the closing process.  If the NSDA can be flown to 
RSLS and transported in folded, but not disassembled condition, considerable delay can 
be avoided. 
 
Clearly there are a variety of ways of closing troops and NSDA to the sea base.   
Sea Basing capability requires new preposition ships and possibly RSLSs and/or  
high-speed connectors.  Analysis is required to choose between the various alternatives 
and the platforms that enable them.  One measure of performance of any alternative is the 
time it takes to close troops to the sea base or the time it takes to close to the sea base and 
deploy to objectives ashore.  Closure time will also depend on whether a warning order 
was issued prior to the deployment order.  One could assume that the decision to establish 
a sea base to support expeditionary maneuver warfare did not come as a surprise and that 
an alert order and warning order were issued sufficiently early to allow the troops, 
aircraft, and ships to be ready to go on receipt of the deployment order without delay.  If 
this is not the case, then a preparation time prior to movement may be specified.  JELO 
allows the user to specify preparation times. 
 
6. Transfer from Connector to MPF(F) 
 
Two of the possibilities for closing forces to the sea base require the transfer of the troops 
transported by the HSC or the RSLS to the MPF(F) ships at sea.  As already noted, we 
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are uninformed as to the nature of this transfer operation.  While it may be possible to 
accomplish this troop transfer with the use of a causeway, such an option would surely be 
sea state limited.  Using a span wire and six-person transfer box yields a transfer rate of 
perhaps 90 troops per hour and is also likely sea state dependent [9].  A safer and more 
robust means of transfer is to airlift the troops from the HSC or RSLS to the MPF(F) 
using available aircraft.  If the MV-22 aircraft self-deploy to the MPF(F) ships, they 
should be able to arrive within five days no matter the location of the sea base [7]. 
 
In order to see how long this transfer takes, something has to be assumed about the HSC 
or RSLS.  The HSC is assumed to be something other than the HSV catamaran.  What is 
known is that the HSC is a ship capable of at least 40 kts speed, configured to embark 
battalion-sized units, and potentially capable of operating tiltrotor aircraft [2].  The 
assumption in the example transfer below is that there are eight HSC vessels, each 
carrying 1,100 troops and having one aircraft operating spot.  Alternatively, there might 
be four RSLSs, each carrying 2,200 Marines and having two aircraft operating spots. 
 
JELO’s movement model, explained in Section 8, is used to estimate how long such a 
transfer will take.  This is a simple operation with a single connector (MV-22), a single 
commodity to be transferred (troops), and a very short distance.  Planning factors for  
MV-22 troop transfers are taken from [4].  Assuming 24 troops per trip, loading time is 
taken to be ten minutes, lift and clear is two minutes, approach and land is two minutes, 
and offload of troops is five minutes.  If the distance between the sending and receiving 
ships is small, say 1,000 yards, flight time is negligible and assumed included in the clear 
and approach operations.  The movement model result is that it will take 9.95 hours to 
complete troop transfer to the MPF(F) using 14 MV-22s, which cumulatively use  
139.3 hours of the 384 available assuming an eight-hour crew-day.  Also presented is the 
time for CH53s to accomplish the same task—8.79 hours with 13 helos, should they have 
reached the MPF(F) in time to perform this task. 
 
HSC MPFF PAX transfer at 1 NM / 48 MV22 or 20 CH53 / 8 Loading Spots





PAX 8062 0 9.95 0 1,2,3, … 8 MV 14 139.3
PAX 8062 0 8.79 0 1,2,3, … 8 CH 13 114.27




Crew Day Used # units hrs/unit Total hrs Used
CH 20 8 160 114.27
MV 48 8 384 139.3
LCAC 20 12 240 0  
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HSC MPFF SBE Transfer























Assembly is the selective breakout of the unit equipment and combat stores by the troops 
who will utilize both once deployed ashore.  The operational status of the unit equipment 
(vehicles, weapons) must be determined and the equipment and stores on the MPF(F) 
staged for the deployment operation.  The length of time needed depends on the status of 
the equipment and the physical characteristics of the MPF(F) ships.  Assembly is not 
modeled.  The goal for assembly is 24-48 hours [6], and the model has this as an  
input parameter. 
 
8. Deploying the Maneuver Elements to Objectives Ashore 
 
The seabased maneuver element of the MEB consists of three reinforced infantry 
battalions and associated direct support.  As already noted, there is a lighter battalion that 
is to be deployed vertically (airlifted from the MPF(F) to the shore objective area), and 
two heavier mechanized battalions that are to be deployed by surface means; implicitly 
the beach is the initial objective area.  Vertical deployment will utilize MV-22 and  
CH-53X aircraft.  Surface deployment will utilize the EFV and LCAC craft.  Both 
vertical and surface deployments involving moving troops, equipment, and two days of 
supply (DOS) of combat stores from the MPF(F) ships to objective areas ashore.  The 
draft Sea Basing Concept of Operations [6] says there must be a minimum of supplies 
held ashore, no more than 2-4 days of supply.  The daily resupply requirement is one day 
of supply, no matter the days of supply maintained ashore, but the safety level increases 
with the number of days of supply maintained ashore. 
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8.1 Deployment of the Vertical Battalion 
 
The battalion to be vertically deployed consists of 1,164 troops whose major equipment 
includes 28 LAVs, eight EFSSs, and 143 HMMWVs variants [10].  The troops will be 
transported by MV-22s and MV-22s will also be involved in transporting the lighter 
vehicles.  The heavier systems will be lifted by the CH-53X helicopter.  The assumption 
is that 48 MV-22s and 20 CH-53Xs are available in the MPF(F) squadron [3], [10].  The 
length of time the vertical deployment requires will depend on the numbers to be lifted, 
the number of aircraft available, and the number of trips each aircraft can make to the 
required distance.  The distance to the landing zone for the Vertical battalion is specified 
as 110 nm [10].  In the movement model, the distance from the MPF(F) to the landing 
zone of the Vertical battalion is an input parameter. 
 
The term “trips” is used instead of sortie.  For fixed wing aircraft, a sortie begins with a 
mission briefing, then engine start, flight, landing, engine shutdown, and debrief.  This 
term is less useful for rotary wing or tiltrotor aircraft whose day’s activities may consist 
of a briefing, engine start, load, fly out, unload, fly back, load again, fly out again, etc., 
with hot refueling as required.  This sort of activity is best described in terms of the 
number of trips. 
 
The MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft will be the most numerous aircraft on the MPF(F) ships.  
They self-deploy to the MPF(F) ships for CONUS locations and can do this in five days 
or less to anywhere in the world [7].  The MV-22 can transport 24 troops internally and 
the speed is assumed to be 240 kts.  With external load (either a vehicle, a sling of cargo 
pallets, or fuel bladders) speed is limited to 100 kts.  Speed with external load is limited 
by the characteristics of the load rather than the aircraft lifting it.  Maximum external load 
weight is 10,000 pounds and may be carried a distance of 110 nm.  The other asset for 
vertical deployment is the CH-53X, a program of record.  The CH-53X is to be a new 
airframe CH-53E with upgraded engines, blades, transmission, and avionics.  The  
CH-53X will lift 6,700 pounds more than the 53E over the same distances as the 53E 
[11].  Vehicles weighing more than the 10,000-pound lift capacity of the MV-22 will be 
flown by CH-53X aircraft.  Its speed with external load is 100 kts and its speed clean is 
130 kts. 
 
The movement model used to determine the time required to deploy the battalion 
calculates the productivity at each aircraft operational spot and then applies that to the 
number of units to be deployed [12].  This cannot be totally automated because there are 
two types of connectors (MV-22 and CH-53X), and troops, equipment, and stores to be 
deployed.  There is a need to have a deployment plan that specifies the pairings between 
cargos and aircraft and the order in which the various commodities will be deployed.  The 
movement model noted in Section 6 and resident in the spreadsheet is used to produce 
battalion deployment times that depend on the deployment plan, number of connectors 
available, number of operational spots available, and distance to which the commodities 
are to be flown.  The user should evaluate one or several deployment plans and import 
the results of the better plan into the main part of the JELO model. 
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As an example of a deployment plan and use of the movement model, deployment of the 
Vertical battalion begins with the assignment of MV-22 aircraft to the lifting of the  
1,164 troops to the landing zone 110 nm distant using two of the assumed four operating 
spots available (one spot per ship and four ships with the troops and equipment of the 
Vertical battalion; alternatively, the battalion on two ships and each ship has two spots).  
In order to avoid queuing of aircraft assets, only 12 of the available 48 are assigned.  
Simultaneously, on spot number 3, 16 of the 20 CH-53Xs start lifting the battalion’s  
28 LAVs, 8 EFSSs, and pallets while on spot number 4, 13 other MV-22s begin lifting 
the battalion’s 143 HMMWVs.  The troops are deployed in 6.44 hours and at that time 
spots 1 and 2, along with spot 4 are utilized by MV-22s to move HMMWVs.  The  
CH-53Xs finish lifting the 36 LAVs/EFSSs and the pallets and bladders representing  
two DOS of provisions, water, fuel, and ammo at 10.23 hours, after which all four spots 
have MV-22s moving HMMWVs.  This deployment plan results in the deployment of the 
Vertical battalion in 12.36 hours and utilizes 342 of the 384 MV-22 crew-day hours 
available and 147 of the 160 CH-53X crew-day hours available.  Details of the 
application of the movement model to the deployment plan are presented in the 
spreadsheet display.  Think of this estimated deployment time as “representative” only, as 
the actual deployment plan will surely be different in detail. 
 
The movement model takes inputs such as the types and numbers of units to be moved, 
the distance, the number of spots, and the types and numbers of connectors, and 
computes the movement times and displays them in the following tables and graph. 
 
Vertical Battalion at 110 NM / 48 MV22 / 20 CH53





PAX 1164 0 6.44 0 1, 2 MV 12 77.28
LAV/EFSS/Pallets 42 0 6.8 0 3 CH 16 108.8
HMMWV 143 0 6.44 95 4 MV 13 83.72
Bladders 22 6.8 10.23 0 3 CH 11 37.73
HMMWV 95 6.44 10.23 28 1,2,4 MV 32 121.28
HMMWV 28 10.23 12.36 0 1,2,3,4 MV 28 59.64
Time PAX LAV EFSS Pallet Bladder HMMWV
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6.44 1164 27 7 5 0 48
6.8 1164 28 8 6 0 52
10.23 1164 28 8 6 22 115
12.36 1164 28 8 6 22 143
Crew Day Use # units hrs/unit Total hrs Used
CH 20 8 160 146.53




























8.2 Deployment of the Surface Battalions 
 
There are two mechanized battalions that are to be surface deployed from 25 nm at sea to 
the shore with the beach as their initial objective.  The deployment of the first  
Surface battalions is to begin simultaneously with the deployment of the  
Vertical battalion.  As the vertical deployment uses almost all of the available aircraft 
crew-hours, the surface deployment operation is conducted by surface connectors 
(LCAC) exclusively.  It is assumed the MPF(F) squadron will have 16-20 LCACs 
available for surface deployment and resupply [3].  The report of the Defense Science 
Board notes that the threat from Mach 3 sea-skimming missiles argues for keeping the 
ships of the sea base 100 miles from the shore [13].  However, connector limitations 
make this distance a most difficult prospect both in deployment operations and in 
resupply.  The developing Sea Basing CONOPS assumes that during deployment MPF(F) 
ships will come to within 25 nm of the coast in consideration of LCAC delivery times, 
EFV transit times and fuel consumption, and aircraft deployment of forces to objectives 
inland from the coast.  While operating at this distance from the coast, Sea Shield 
provided by combatants of the CSG and ESG must defend the sea base ships. 
 
The surface-deployed battalions each consist of 1,840 troops with 53 EFVs,  
14 M1A1 tanks, 28 LAVs, 6 LW155 artillery pieces, 6 HIMARSs, 157 HMMWV 
variants, 45 MTVRs, and 18 LVSs [10].  The 53 EFVs self-deploy from the MPF(F) 
ships to the shore with 20 Marines per vehicle (3 crew and 17 pax).  This deployement 
carries 1,060 of the 1,840 troops to the shore.  The other 780 troops are carried by 
LCACs while they deploy the battalion’s vehicles and stores.  The vehicles/weapon 
systems to be deployed include HMMWVs, LAVs, M1A1 tanks, MTVRs, HIMARS, 
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LVSs, and light-weight 155mm howitzers.  Each vehicle/weapon system has its own load 
and unload times, and number the LCAC can transport in a single trip, necessitating use 
of the transfer model separately for each. 
 
The movement model is a circulation model used to calculate time required to deploy 
material and personnel considering loads, connectors, loading spots, and distance as 
major parameters.  The model was used in connection with transferring troops from the 
HSC or RSLS to the MPF(F) ships in Section 6 and with the deployment of the  
Vertical battalion in Section 8.1 as well, but a full explanation is given here. 
 
The JELO movement model is based on a fundamental calculation of connector cycle 
time as proposed by Keith McAllister in [12].  Below is a screenshot of the complete 




Number of Cargo/Pax (total units) 157
Number of Connectors (total units) 20
Number of Loading Spots 4 No queuing due to spots





Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of  connectors (McAllister) 10.0 minutes
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 2.65 159.0
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 0.900 54.0
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 0.500 30.0
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 0.625 37.5
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 0.625 37.5
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 4
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 4.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 2.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 12
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 2
Connectors per spot (fully utilized, no queue) 2.94 2.9 Connectors per spot (no queue)
Spots required/provided 3.40 141.3 Throughput per cycle
Load offloaded loading cycle 40.75 53.3 Throughput per hour
Productivity (load/min) 0.75
3.47 2.94 Cargo/PAX divided by throughput
ime to complete (JELO)
DATA TABLES
Load Type Load Rate Discharge Rate LCAC Speed 
Bladder 4 2 Sea State Speed (kts)
CH_53 120 60 0 40
EFSS 4 2 1 40
HIMAR 4 2 2 35
HMMWV 4 2 3 30
LAV 4 2 4 25






ConnectorType Eq. Factor Ingress Speed (kts) Egress Speed (kts) Time approach (min) Time to Clear (min)
C_17 2 540 540 5 5
CH53_external 3 100 130 2 2
CH53_internal 3 130 130 2 2
EFV 2 25 25 2 2
LCAC 2 40 40 4 2
MV22_external 3 100 240 2 2
MV22_internal 3 240 240 2 2
Load Type C_17 CH53_external CH53_internal EFV LCAC MV22_external MV22_internal
Bladder 0 2 0 0 8 2
CH_53 1 0 0 0 0 0
EFSS 0 1 0 0 4 0
HIMAR 0 1 0 0 4 0
HMMWV 0 1 0 0 12 1 0
LAV 0 1 0 0 4 0
LVS 0 0 0 0 2 0
LW155 0 1 0 0 4 0
M1A1 1 0 0 0 1 0
MTVR 0 0 0 0 3 0
PAX_fast 102 0 55 20 24 0 24
PAX_slow 102 0 55 20 24 0 24














As an example of the movement model, the following computations and  
Excel screenshots illustrate the cycle time calculation per [12] and JELO modifications to 
account for surge operations and minimum achievable movement times. 
 
Suppose the requirement is transfer of 157 HMMWVs 25 nm to the ashore objective 
using as many as 20 LCACs and 4 loading spots with Sea State 0.  Parameters are entered 
as shown—the first four values may be entered directly into their cell, or may be 
manipulated by the associated scroll bar; Sea State, Load, and Connector Type are 




Number of Cargo/Pax (total units)
Number of Connectors (total units)
Number of Loading Spots
One-way distance to objective (N
Sea State
Load Type









Next, a number of parameter values are set.  For example, each load type is assigned 
characteristics for load and discharge rates.  Rates are entered as minutes per unit of load; 
for example, HMMWVs are loaded to various connectors at a rate of four minutes per 
vehicle loaded and discharged at a rate of two minutes per vehicle unloaded. 
 












PAX_slow 0.417 0.208  
 
Connector capacities, with respect to load types, are contained in a feasibility matrix.  In 
this table, load types are cross-walked to specific connector configurations.  In this 
instance, either CH-53s or MV-22s externally carry one HMMWV per lift, or LCACs 
transport 12 HMMWVs per lift. 
 
Load Type C_17 CH53_external CH53_internal EFV LCAC MV22_external MV22_internal
Bladder 0 2 0 0 8 2
CH_53 1 0 0 0 0 0
EFSS 0 1 0 0 4 0
HIMAR 0 1 0 0 4 0
HMMWV 0 1 0 0 12 1 0
LAV 0 1 0 0 4 0
LVS 0 0 0 0 2 0
LW155 0 1 0 0 4 0
M1A1 1 0 0 0 1 0
MTVR 0 0 0 0 3 0
PAX_fast 102 0 55 20 24 0 24













Ingress and egress speeds are assigned by connector configuration, as are approach and 
clearing times.  In this example, an LCAC has ingress and egress speeds of 40 kts, a  
four-minute approach time, and a two-minute clearing time.  The Sea State parameter in 
the JELO movement model is used to impose degraded surface craft speeds in higher  
Sea States. 
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ConnectorType Eq. Factor Ingress Speed (kts) Egress Speed (kts) Time approach (min) Time to Clear (min)
C_17 2 540 540 5 5
CH53_external 3 100 130 2 2
CH53_internal 3 130 130 2 2
EFV 2 25 25 2
LCAC 2 40 40 4
MV22_external 3 100 240 2 2












5 0  
 
Load (TL) and Offload (TO) times are a result of approach and clearing times and loading 
or discharge rates multiplied by the number of load units per lift.  Cycle time (TC) is 
calculated as the sum of load, offload, ingress, and egress times.  In the table below, we 
see an example of LCAC transport of HMMWVs for a distance of 25 nm with  
TC = 2.65 hrs, TL = 0.90 hrs, and TO = 0.50 hrs. 
 
Calculated/Look-up Factors
Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of connectors (McAllister) 10.0 minutes
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 2.65 159
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 0.900 54.00
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 0.500 30.00
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 0.625 37.5
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 0.625 37.5
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 4
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 4.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 2.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 12
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 2  
 
A series of intermediate calculations are performed to determine the maximum number of 
connectors per loading spot and throughput rates—which are then applied to the total 
requirement to calculate the time for movement completion. 
 
Problem parameters
Number of Cargo/Pax (total units) 157  
 
2.94 Connectors per spot (no queue)
141.3 Throughput per cycle (all con/spots)
53.3 Throughput per hour
2.94 Cargo/PAX divided by throughput
Time to complete (JELO MM)  4.73
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Specific calculation details are described below. 
 
Per [12], to calculate the round-trip cycle time (TC) for LCACs: 
 
TC = load time (TL) + 2 x one-way transit time (TT) + offload time (TO) 
 
We modify this calculation in the JELO movement model by allowing different 
ingress/egress transit speeds, so that: 
 
TC = TL + ingress time (TIN) + egress time (TOUT) + TO 
 
Where: 
TL or TO = TA/M + (R x nV) + TC/C 
 
With: 
TA/M = time to approach and moor 
 
R = load or discharge rate (min per unit of load) 
 
nV = units of load per connector lift 
 
TC/C = time to cast-off/take-off and clear 
 
So: 
TL = TA/M + (R x nV) + TC/C 
 
 = 4 min + [(4 min/vehicle) x (12 vehicles)] + 2 min 
 
 = 54 min = 0.90 hrs 
 
TO = TA/M + (R x nV) + TC/C 
 
 = 4 min + [(2 min/vehicle) x (12 vehicles)] + 2 min 
 
 = 30 min = 0.50 hrs 
 
Calculated/Look-up Factors
Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of connectors (McAllister) 10.0 minutes
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 2.65 159
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 0.900 54.00
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 0.500 30.00
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 0.625 37.5
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 0.625 37.5
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 4
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 4.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 2.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 12
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 2  
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The time for the ingress trip from 25 nm will be: 
 
   
D 
        TIN = ------------ 
  V 
 




  25 nm 
        TIN = ------------ 
  40 kts 
 
   = 0.63 hrs or 37.5 min 
 
Calculated/Look-up Factors
Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of connectors (McAllister) 10.0 minutes
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 2.65 159
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 0.900 54.00
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 0.500 30.00
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 0.625 37.5
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 0.625 37.5
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 4
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 4.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 2.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 12
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 2  
 
In this case, TIN = TOUT, so: 
 
TC = TL + TIN + TOUT + TO 
 
 = 54 min + 37.5 min + 37.5 min + 30 min 
 
 = 159 min or 2.65 hrs 
 
Calculated/Look-up Factors
Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of connectors (McAllister) 10.0 minutes
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 2.65 159
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 0.900 54.00
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 0.500 30.00
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 0.625 37.5
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 0.625 37.5
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 4
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 4.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 2.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 12
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 2  
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To calculate the number of connectors required to utilize fully one loading spot: 
 
        TC     
NCONNMAX = ---------------   
       TL        
 
   159 min 
=   --------------- 
  54 min 
 
  =   2.94 LCACs are required to utilize fully one loading spot 
 
2.94 Connectors per spot (no queue)
141.3 Throughput per cycle (all con/spots)
53.3 Throughput per hour
2.94 Cargo/PAX divided by throughput
Time to complete (JELO MM)  4.73
 
Note that this value also represents the maximum number of connectors that we would 
plan for any loading spot to prevent intentional queuing (that is, queuing caused by an 
oversupply of connector assets with respect to the cycle time/loading time ratio at a 
particular loading spot). 
 
Connectors per spot (CONNSPOT) is the minimum of: 
 
1) McAllister’s fully utilized spot (NCONNMAX) and, 
 
2) the ratio of number of connectors (NCONN) to number of loading spots (NSPOTS). 
 
CONNSPOT = min (NCONNMAX, (NCONN/NSPOTS)) 
 
  = min (2.94, 20/4) 
 
  = 2.94 
 
Number of Connectors (total units) 20
Number of Loading Spots 4  
 
Connectors per spot (McAllister, fully utilized, no queue) 2.944 2.94 Connectors per spot (no queue)  
 
This ensures that we do not calculate a lift capability per spot that is greater than the 
physical assets we have assigned.  McAllister’s model assumes full utilization per spot, 
while the JELO movement model uses NCONNMAX as an upper bound and allows partial 
utilization of a loading spot. 
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Throughput per cycle (THRUCYC) is the product of the number of loading spots (NSPOTS), 
units of cargo per connector lift (nV), and Connectors per spot (CONNSPOT). 
 
THRUCYC = (NSPOTS) (nV) (CONNSPOT) 
 
  = (4 spots/cycle) (12 HMMWVs/LCAC) (2.94 LCACs/Spot) 
 
  = 141.3 HMMWVs per cycle 
 
2.94 Connectors per spot (no queue)
141.3 Throughput per cycle (all con/spots)
53.3 Throughput per hour
2.94 Cargo/PAX divided by throughput
Time to complete (JELO MM)  4.73
 
Throughput per hour (THRUHR) is the throughput per cycle (THRUCYC divided by the 
Time per cycle (TC).  In this example: 
 
  THRUCYC 
THRUHR = ------------------ 
          TC 
 
        141.3 HMMWVs/cycle 
  = --------------------------- 
   2.65 hrs/cycle 
 
  = 53.3 HMMWVs per hr 
 
Finally, the time to complete the offload (TTOTAL)—that is, the HMMWVs arrive at the 
ashore objective—is the maximum of: 
 
1) the total cargo movement requirement (NCARGO) divided by the hourly 
throughput (THRUHR) and  
 
2) the sum of the running time for all loading evolutions, plus the ingress time 
(TIN), plus the offload time (TO). 
 
The sum of the running time for all loading evolutions is calculated as the Time to load 
(TL) multiplied by the maximum whole number of concurrent loading evolutions that 
must take place—that is, the ceiling (or round-up to the next integer) of NCARGO divided 
by the product of the minimum of the number of connectors (NCONN) or number of 
loading spots (NSPOTS) and number of units lifted per connector load (nV).  Specifically: 
 
TTOTAL = max {(NCARGO/THRUHR), ∑ [(TL) x Ceiling (NCARGO/(min(NCONN,NSPOTS) x  
          nV)), TIN, TO]} 
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 = max {(157/53.3), ∑ [(0.9) x Ceiling (157/(min(20, 4) x 12)), 0.5, 0.625]} 
 
 = max (2.95, 4.73) = 4.73 hrs to complete the HMMWV offload 
 
Connectors per spot (McAllister, fully utilized, no queue) 2.944 2.94 Connectors per spot (no queue)
Spots required/provided 3.396 141.3 Throughput per cycle (all con/spots)
Load offloaded loading cycle 40.755 53.3 Throughput per hour
Productivity (load/min) 0.755
3.47 2.94 Cargo/PAX divided by throughput
Time to complete (JELO MM)




It should be noted that the same result can be accomplished with far fewer assets—that is, 
a 4.73-hour completion with fewer than 20 LCACs.  Since we had calculated a maximum 
of 2.94 connectors per spot to avoid queuing, and we currently employ five LCACs per 
spot (20 LCACs divided by four spots), we should be able to decrease the total number of 
LCACs and achieve the same completion time.  This is the case, as pictured below, where 
12 LCACs are using four loading spots. 
 
Problem parameters
Number of Cargo/Pax (total units) 157
Number of Connectors (total units) 12
Number of Loading Spots 4 No queuing due to spots





Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of connectors (McAllister) 6.0 minutes
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 2.65 159
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 0.900 54.00
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 0.500 30.00
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 0.625 37.5
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 0.625 37.5
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 4
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 4.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 2.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 12
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 2
Connectors per spot (McAllister, fully utilized, no queue) 2.944 2.94 Connectors per spot (no queue)
Spots required/provided 2.038 141.3 Throughput per cycle (all con/spots)
Load offloaded loading cycle 24.453 53.3 Throughput per hour
Productivity (load/min) 0.453
5.78 2.94 Cargo/PAX divided by throughput
Time to complete (JELO MM)
Time to complete offload (hrs) given 3 spots (McAllister)
 
 
And, in fact, the number of LCACs can be decreased to as few as eight, and the 4.73-hour 




Number of Cargo/Pax (total units)
Number of Connectors (total units)
Number of Loading Spots No queuing due to spots





Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of connectors (McAllister) 4.0 minutes
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 2.65 159
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 0.900 54.00
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 0.500 30.00
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 0.625 37.5
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 0.625 37.5
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 4
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 4.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 2.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 12
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 2
Connectors per spot (McAllister, fully utilized, no queue) 2.944 2.00 Connectors per spot (no queue)
Spots required/provided 1.358 96.0 Throughput per cycle (all con/spots)
Load offloaded loading cycle 16.302 36.2 Throughput per hour
Productivity (load/min) 0.302
8.67 4.33 Cargo/PAX divided by throughput
Time to complete (JELO MM)







This example detailed the calculations necessary for a single Load and Connector Type.  
There is a governing requirement to have a deployment plan that specifies the pairings 
between cargos and connectors and the order in which the various commodities will be 
deployed.  The plan presented makes trade-offs among the connector assets and  
load types to achieve an overall timeline that is less than a simple serial deployment time, 
which sequentially focuses on individual load types.  Prudent tactical employment likely 
argues against offloading load types serially, however, these tactical considerations have 
not been fully explored, and the calculations presented in this report should be considered 
reasonable surrogates for the detailed deployment plan that would be executed. 
 
As an example of a full deployment plan using the movement model, envision 
deployment of a Surface battalion (see table below).  Deployment begins with the 
assignment of 53 EFVs to transporting 1,060 troops to a landing zone 25 nm distant using 
all four of the assumed loading spots available (one spot per ship and four ships with the 
troops and equipment of the Surface battalion; alternatively, the battalion on 2 ships and 
each ship has two spots).  There is no circulation of these EFV assets, so the end time of 
1.75 hours reflects queuing for departure from the Sea Base.  Once the EFVs have 
cleared the loading spots, deployment of the other load types can begin.  In order to avoid 
queuing of LCACs, only 15 of the available 20 are initially assigned.  Simultaneously, on 
spot numbers 1 and 2, ten of the 20 LCACs start lifting the battalion’s 14 M1A1s, while 




Surface Battalion at 25 NM / 20 LCAC / 4 Loading Spots





PAX 1840 780 EFV n/a
M1A1 14 0 LCAC 24.3
LAV 28 7.61 0 LCAC 4 13.72
LW155 6 4.18 5.77 0 2 LCAC 2 3.18
HIMARS 6 0 LCAC 2 3.18
HMMWV 157 0 LCAC 5 37.15
MTVR 45 0 LCAC 9 29.52
LVS 18 9.18 11.14 0 3,4 LCAC 8 15.68
Time PAX M1A1 LAV LW155 HIMARS HMMWV MTVR LVS
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.75 1060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.18 1261 14 0 0 0 51 0 0
5.77 1392 14 12 6 0 84 0 0
7.36 1523 14 24 6 6 117 0 0
7.61 1543 14 28 6 6 122 0 0
9.18 1673 14 28 6 6 157 21 0
10.89 1814 14 28 6 6 157 45 15
11.14 1840 14 28 6 6 157 45 18
Crew Day Used # units hrs/unit Total hrs Used
CH 20 8 160 0
MV 48 8 384 0






















Note:  In the movement model detailed previously, we found that the minimum time for 
deployment of 157 HMMWVs was accomplished using four spots with as few as  
eight LCACs.  We’re now proposing use of only two loading spots, and the minimum 
time for the HMMWV deployment is achieved with only five LCACs.  Thus, HMMWV 
deployment time is 7.43 hours (below) and reflected in the deployment plan (above) as 




Number of Cargo/Pax (total units)
Number of Connectors (total units)
Number of Loading Spots No queuing due to spots





Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of connectors (McAllister) 2.5 minutes
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 2.65 159
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 0.900 54.00
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 0.500 30.00
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 0.625 37.5
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 0.625 37.5
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 4
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 4.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 2.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 12
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 2
Connectors per spot (McAllister, fully utilized, no queue) 2.944 2.50 Connectors per spot (no queue)
Spots required/provided 0.849 60.0 Throughput per cycle (all con/spots)
Load offloaded loading cycle 10.189 22.6 Throughput per hour
Productivity (load/min) 0.189
13.87 6.93 Cargo/PAX divided by throughput
Time to complete (JELO MM)








M1A1 deployment is complete at 4.18 hours, so LAV and LW155 deployments begin on 
loading spots 1 and 2 using four and two LCACs, respectively.  HIMARS deployment 
begins on loading spot 2 at 5.77 hours.  MTVR deployment begins at both spots 1 and 2 
at 7.61 hours.  HMMWV deployment is complete at 9.18 hours, so LVS deployment can 
begin on loading spots 3 and 4.  The two DOS of combat stores are carried in tactically 
loaded vehicles as they are deployed from the MPF(F).  This deployment plan results in 
the deployment of a Surface battalion in 11.14 hours and utilizes nearly 127 of the  
240 LCAC crew-day hours available. 
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Surface Battalion at 25 NM / 20 LCAC / 4 Loading Spots





PAX 1840 0 1.75 780 1,2,3,4 EFV 53 n/a
M1A1 14 1.75 4.18 0 1,2 LCAC 10 24.3
LAV 28 4.18 7.61 0 1 LCAC 4 13.72
LW155 6 4.18 5.77 0 2 LCAC 2 3.18
HIMARS 6 5.77 7.36 0 2 LCAC 2 3.18
HMMWV 157 1.75 9.18 0 3,4 LCAC 5 37.15
MTVR 45 7. 0 1,2 LCAC 9 29.52
LVS 18 9. 0 3,4 LCAC 8 15.68
Time PAX M1A1 LAV LW155 HIMARS HMMWV MTVR LVS
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.75 1060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.18 1261 14 0 0 0 51 0 0
5.77 1392 14 12 6 0 84 0 0
7.36 1523 14 24 6 6 117 0 0
7.61 1543 14 28 6 6 122 0 0
9.18 1673 14 28 6 6 157 21 0
10.89 1814 14 28 6 6 157 45 15
11.14 1840 14 28 6 6 157 45 18
Crew Day Used # units hrs/unit Total hrs Used
CH 20 8 160 0
MV 48




































Decisions regarding how many loading spots and connectors to assign to each load type 
were made by considering the total numbers of loading spots and connectors available, 
the impact on crew-day used by the connectors, and the desirability for balanced arrival 
of load types to the objective.  The table below details some of the trade-offs with regard 
to the Surface battalion movement.  Highlighted rows are the selections made for the 
example detailed above. 
 
Loads Total req LCACs Spots Time Cr Day Use
M1A1 14 8 1 4.06 32.48
14 10 2 2.43 24.3
14 12 3 1.96 23.52
LAV 28 4 1 3.43 13.72
28 6 2 2.33 13.98
28 7 3 1.96 13.72
LW155 6 2 1 1.59 3.18
6 3 2 1.23 3.69
HIMARS 6 2 1 1.59 3.18
6 3 2 1.23 3.69
HMMWV 157 3 1 13.73 41.19
157 5 2 7.43 37.15
157 7 3 5.63 39.41
MTVR 45 6 1 5.33 31.98
45 9 2 3.28 29.52
45 12 3 2.33 27.96
LVS 18 6 1 2.89 17.34
18 8 2 1.96 15.68
18 10 3 1.49 14.9
Choices considered for number of LCACs and Spots per load
 
 
9. Illustrative Examples 
 
To demonstrate the use of the JELO spreadsheet model, a few of the many possible ways 
of flowing expeditionary ground forces from CONUS to the sea base are explored as 
examples.  The examples vary the methods and parameters of closing forces to the sea 
base.  These examples use the transfer results from Section 6 if applicable, and the 
deployment results from Section 8. 
 
The examples involve a few of the many possible combinations of rapid strategic lift 
ships, strategic airlift, and high speed connectors in accomplishing the closure of troops 
and non-self deploying aircraft (NSDA) to the sea base.  Example 1 involves using 
strategic airlift and high speed connectors under various (four in total) assumptions 
regarding the timeliness and availability of strategic airlift aircraft.  Example 2 involves 
using high speed rapid strategic lift ships to move troops and NSDA to the sea base 
without the requirement for strategic airlift or high speed connectors transiting between 
the advance base and the sea base.  Example 3 involves either strategic airlift or rapid 
strategic lift ships transporting troops and NSDA to the advance base and being loaded 
onto the MPF(F) ships at the advance base thus eliminating the need for transfers at sea.  
The results of all seven examples are optimistic in the sense that they assume the issuance 
of a warning order sufficiently in advance of the deployment order that many of the 
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“preparation” delays may be avoided.  The model accepts various preparation delays if 
this is not the case. 
 
9.1 Example 1 
 
In this example, and three variations on it, the troops of the Seabased Echelon plus the 
Naval Support Element (NSE) are flown by CRAF aircraft from CONUS to the advance 
base.  At the advance base the troops transfer in port to HSC vessels for transport to the 
sea base.  The number of HSCs and their passenger capacities are assumed to be 
sufficient to carry the full Seabased Echelon without making multiple roundtrips.  It is 
assumed that the MV-22 self deploy from CONUS to the sea base.  MPF(F) proceed 















Figure 5.  MPF(F) Direct to Sea Base, HSCs Utilized 
 
Non-self-deploying aircraft (NSDA) are flown by strategic airlift to the advance base and 
sealifted onward to the MPF(F) ships at the sea base; details will be presented directly.  
Once the HSCs carrying the troops arrive at the sea base, the troops must be transferred 
to the MPF(F) ships. 
 
This example was evaluated with the JELO Excel model (Figure 6) using notional 
parameter entries, resulting in troop closure at the ashore objective in 194.6 hours, or 
approximately 8.1 days.  This is the most optimistic of the example results and assumes, 
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in addition to an early warning order being issued, that strategic airlift can begin with 
sufficient aircraft made available directly on issuance of the deployment order. 
 
In general, all parameter values are user selectable—the color convention is: 
 
Blue – values that are entered elsewhere in the spreadsheet and are simply 
referenced at the current cell. 
Green – values that are directly entered at the current cell.  Currently, some of 
these values have Data Validation to facilitate rational data entry. 
Black – calculated values. 
Light Yellow highlight (first column to the right of data parameters) – 
intermediate results that may be of interest. 
Deep Yellow highlight (column furthest to the right) – output of interest. 
 
Entries circled in Figure 6 will be discussed in detail below, along with an explanation of 





1.0 MPFF SeaState 0
1.1 MPFF preparation time for underway (hrs) 0
1.2 SubOutput: MPFF transit time to SeaBase (NM) 75.0
1.2.1 MPFF transit distance to SeaBase (NM) 1800
1.2.2 MPFF transit speed (kts) 24
1.2.2.1 MPFF Effective Speed 24.0
1.3 Output: Time from deployment order to MPFF arrives SeaBase (hrs) 75.0
2 Troop Movement to AB
2.1 Troop POM delay at CONUS origin (hrs) 0
2.1.1 Number of troops for lift (pax) 8062
2.2 Troops transported to APOE (hrs) 4
2.3 Time to schedule airlift (hrs) 0
2.4 Time sequence for airlift arrival/departure APOE (hrs) 0
2.5 Time to load airlift at APOE (hrs) 4
2.6 SubOutput: Time to fly CONUS to AB (hrs) 11.1
2.6.1 Distance APOE to AB (NM) 6000
2.6.2 Speed APOE to AB (kts) 540
2.7 Output: Time from deployment order until Troops arrive AB 19.1
3 Troop Movement to MPFF Ships
3.0 HSC SeaState 0
3.1 Troops deplane at AB, move to HSC (hrs) 8
3.2 SubOutput: HSC time to AB (post deployment order) (hrs) 0.0
3.2.1 HSC distance to AB at deployment order (NM) 0
3.2.2 HSC  transit speed (kts) 40
3.2.2.1 HSC unladen Effective Speed 40.0
3.3 SubOutput: Troop delay awaiting HSC (hrs) 0.0
3.4 HSC parameters:
3.4.1 Vessel capacity (pax) 1100
3.4.2 Number of vessels (units) 8
3.4.2.1 SubOutput: HSC shuttle required (Yes/No) No
3.5 Troop onload to HSC (hrs) 4
3.6 SubOutput: HSC Transit time AB to SeaBase (hrs) 50.0
3.6.1 HSC transit distance AB to SeaBase (NM) 2000
3.6.2 HSC transit speed (kts) 40
3.6.2.1 HSC burdened Effective Speed 40.0
3.7 SubOutput: Time to move Troops from AB to SeaBase (hrs) 62.0
3.8 Time to transfer Troops from HSC to SeaBase (hrs) 9.95
3.9 SubOutput: Delay of HSC/Troops waiting for MPFF 0.0
3.10 SubOutput: Time to move Troops from AB to MPFF ships (hrs) 72.0
3.11 Output: Total time Deployment Order to Troops close MPFF at SeaBase (hrs) 91.1
3A Non-self deploying aircraft (NSDA) movement CONUS to AB/SeaBase
3A.0 NSDA SeaState 0
3A.1 Time to reposition NSDA at APOE in CONUS (hrs) 12
3A.1.1 Time to assemble airlift 0
3A.2 Time to disassemble NSDA for transport flight to AB (hrs) 36
3A.3 SubOutput: Transport flight time CONUS APOE to AB (hrs) 11.1
3A.3.1 NSDA Transport Distance (NM) 6000
3A.3.2 NSDA Transport Speed (kts) 540
3A.3.3 Airlift time by circulation model (hrs - compute offline) 0
3A.4 SubOutput: Time for NSDA ready for onload HSC (hrs) 107.1
3A.4.1 Reassembly time of NSDA at AB (hrs) 36
3A.4.2 Flight test of NSDA at AB (hrs) 12
3A.4.3 Preparation of NSDA for onload to HSC (hrs) 0
3A.5 NSDA Delay at AB awaiting HSC (hrs) 0.0
3A.5.1 Dedicated HSC available for NSDA? Yes
3A.6 NSDA onload to HSC 0
3A.7 NSDA transit on HSC from AB to MPFF/SeaBase (hrs) 50.0
3A.7.1 Distance (NM) 2000
3A.7.2 HSC burdened speed (kts) 40
3A.7.2.1 HSC NSDA Effective Speed 40.0
3A.8 NSDA transfer from HSC to MPFF (hrs) 2
3A.9 Output: NSDA close at SeaBase (hrs) 159.1
4 Assembly of Force Package
4.1 Mating-up of Troops and unit equipment (hrs) 24
4.2 Output:  Time force package available for transport MPFF to shore (hrs) 115.1
4.3 SubOutput:  Delay awaiting NSDA for foreward movement (hrs) 44.1
5 Deploy Force Package to Objectives Ashore
5.0 Assault Package Deployment Time (hrs) 35.5
5.0.1 Vertical  Battalion Deployment Times (hrs) 12.36
5.0.2 First Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) 11.14
5.0.3 Operational Pause/Crew-Rest delay (hrs) 12
5.0.4 Second Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) 11.14
5.1 Output: Time to put Troops at objective area - since deployment order (hrs)
 
Figure 6.  JELO Excel Model, Example 1:  MPF(F) Direct to Sea Base,  
HSCs Utilized 
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Several of the JELO time components are simple distance/speed calculations.  The time 
for the MPF(F) to transit to the sea base is 1,800 nm/24 kts = 75.0 hours.  The three Blue 
entries are all entered on a common worksheet and are Global parameters—that is, they 
will be referenced by one, or more, of the possible closure models.  Note that Sea State 
will impact effective speed for surface vessels—higher Sea States degrade speed.  Except 
for the LCACs used in the movement ashore, we do not have valid data for the Sea State 




1.0 MPFF SeaState M1 MPFM1_ 0
1.1 MPFF preparation time for underway (hrs) M1 MPFM1_ 0
1.2 SubOutput: MPFF transit time to SeaBase (NM) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_MP 75.0
1.2.1 MPFF transit distance to SeaBase (NM) M1 MPFM1_ 1800
1.2.2 MPFF transit speed (kts) M1 MPFM1_ 24
1.2.2.1 MPFF Effective Speed M1 MPFM1_ 24.0
1.3 Output: Time from deployment order to MPFF arrives SeaBase (hrs) M1 Out_M1_Out_time_MPFF_close_SeaBa 75.0  
 
Other time components within JELO may be sequences of events that occur in series 
and/or parallel.  The time for completion of the sequence is the sum of the individual 
events, with consideration for concurrent events.  As an example of concurrent  
(or parallel) events, we model the sequential series “Troop Preparation for Overseas 
Movement (POM) and Transport time to the APOE” as occurring in parallel with the 
sequential series “Time to schedule airlift and Time for airlift to assemble at the APOE,” 
so only the maximum of these two serial times would count against the total for the entire 
sequence.  Troop movement to the advance base is calculated as the sum of: 
 
MAX(Troop Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) + Transport time to the APOE,  
 Time to schedule airlift + Time for airlift to assemble at the APOE)  
 + Time to load aboard the airlift + Time to fly to the advance base 
 
In this example, some of these times are assumed equal to 0 (zero) due to issuance of a 
warning order prior to an execution order.  Note that troop closure to the advance base 
takes 19.1 hours. 
 
2 Troop Movement to AB
2.1 Troop POM delay at CONUS origin (hrs) M1 TrooM1_ 0
2.1.1 Number of troops for lift (pax) M1 TrooM1_ 8062
2.2 Troops transported to APOE (hrs) M1 TrooM1_ 4
2.3 Time to schedule airlift (hrs) M1 AirlifM1_ 0
2.4 Time sequence for airlift arrival/departure APOE (hrs) M1 AirlifM1_ 0
2.5 Time to load airlift at APOE (hrs) M1 AirlifM1_ 4
2.6 SubOutput: Time to fly CONUS to AB (hrs) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_airli 11.1
2.6.1 Distance APOE to AB (NM) M1 AirlifM1_ 6000
2.6.2 Speed APOE to AB (kts) M1 AirlifM1_ 540
2.7 Output: Time from deployment order until Troops arrive AB M1 Out_M1_Out_troop_closure_FLS 19.1  
Serial sequences 
that occur in 
parallel. 
 
After arriving at the advance base, the troops take time to deplane (eight hours) and then 
embark (four hours) on the HSCs.  HSCs are assumed to be located at the advance base, 
though there is provision to calculate any delay that may be incurred if that were not the 
case.  Travel to the sea base is again a distance/speed calculation (2,000 nm/40 kts =  
50 hours).  Transfer from the HSC to the MPF(F) was calculated as 9.95 hours using the 
JELO movement model and then was entered into this closure model.  Troops close the 
sea base at 91.1 hours after the deployment execution order, or 3.8 days. 
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91.1
3 Troop Movement to MPFF Ships
3.0 HSC SeaState M1 HSCM1_ 0
3.1 Troops deplane at AB, move to HSC (hrs) M1 TrooM1_ 8
3.2 SubOutput: HSC time to AB (post deployment order) (hrs) M1 Sub M1_SubO 0.0
3.2.1 HSC distance to AB at deployment order (NM) M1 HSCM1_
3.2.2 HSC  transit speed (kts) M1 HSCM1_
3.2.2.1 HSC unladen Effective Speed M1 HSCM1_ 40.0
3.3 SubOutput: Troop delay awaiting HSC (hrs) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_Tro 0.0
3.4 HSC parameters:
3.4.1 Vessel capacity (pax) M1 HSCM1_ 1100
3.4.2 Number of vessels (units) M1 HSCM1_ 8
3.4.2.1 SubOutput: HSC shuttle required (Yes/No) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_HSCNo
3.5 Troop onload to HSC (hrs) M1 TrooM1_ 4
3.6 SubOutput: HSC Transit time AB to SeaBase (hrs) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_HSC 50.0
3.6.1 HSC transit distance AB to SeaBase (NM) M1 HSCM1_ 2000
3.6.2 HSC transit speed (kts) M1 HSCM1_ 40
3.6.2.1 HSC burdened Effective Speed M1 HSCM1_ 40.0
3.7 SubOutput: Time to move Troops from AB to SeaBase (hrs) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_time 62.0
3.8 Time to transfer Troops from HSC to SeaBase (hrs) M1 Tim M1_ 9.95
3.9 SubOutput: Delay of HSC/Troops waiting for MPFF M1 Sub M1_SubOut_troo 0.0
3.10 SubOutput: Time to move Troops from AB to MPFF ships (hrs) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_time 72.0





The non-self-deploying aircraft (NSDA) present a straightforward series of events related 
to movement by strategic airlift.  Note that the delay in the availability of strategic airlift, 
data element 3A.1.1, is set to zero in this example.  NSDA will take 48 hours to position 
and prepare for transport, then incur a distance/speed time for travel to the advance base, 
then must reassemble and conduct check flights (another 48 hours) for a total delay of 
107.1 hours prior to loading aboard the HSC for lift to the sea base.  Transit to the sea 
base is a simple distance/speed calculation, to which we add the flyoff transfer time and 
calculate a total time for NSDA sea base closure at 159.1 hours, or 6.6 days. 
 
3A Non-self deploying aircraft (NSDA) movement CONUS to AB/SeaBase
3A.0 NSDA SeaState 0
3A.1 Time to reposition NSDA at APOE in CONUS (hrs) 12
3A.1.1 Time to assemble airlift 0
3A.2 Time to disassemble NSDA for transport flight to AB (hrs) 36
3A.3 SubOutput: Transport flight time CONUS APOE to AB (hrs) 11.1
3A.3.1 NSDA Transport Distance (NM) 6000
3A.3.2 NSDA Transport Speed (kts) 540
3A.3.3 Airlift time by circulation model (hrs - compute offline) 0
3A.4 SubOutput: Time for NSDA ready for onload HSC (hrs) 107.1
3A.4.1 Reassembly time of NSDA at AB (hrs) 36
3A.4.2 Flight test of NSDA at AB (hrs) 12
3A.4.3 Preparation of NSDA for onload to HSC (hrs) 0
3A.5 NSDA Delay at AB awaiting HSC (hrs) 0.0
3A.5.1 Dedicated HSC available for NSDA? Yes
3A.6 NSDA onload to HSC 0
3A.7 NSDA transit on HSC from AB to MPFF/SeaBase (hrs) 50.0
3A.7.1 Distance (NM) 2000
3A.7.2 HSC burdened speed (kts) 40
3A.7.2.1 HSC NSDA Effective Speed 40.0
3A.8 NSDA transfer from HSC to MPFF (hrs) 2
3A.9 Output: NSDA close at SeaBase (hrs) 159.1  
 
Adding 24 hours, for mating-up with equipment, to the 91.1 required for Troop closure 
on the MPF(F), we calculate that the troops are ready for onward movement 115.1 hours 
(4.8 days) after the deployment order.  However, we had just calculated that the NSDA 
would not arrive until 159.1 hours, so there is a delay of at least 44 hours waiting for  
the NSDA. 
 
4 Assembly of Force Package M1
4.1 Mating-up of Troops and unit equipment (hrs) M1 ForcM1_ 24
4.2 Output:  Time force package available for transport MPFF to shore (hrs) M1 Out_M1_Out_ForcePack_time_available 115.1
4.3 SubOutput:  Delay awaiting NSDA for foreward movement (hrs) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_For 44.1  
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Finally, with all required elements having closed the sea base, onward movement to the 
ashore objectives can commence.  As demonstrated in Section 8, the JELO movement 
model can be used to calculate deployment times for the Vertical- and Surface-deployed 
battalions.  As before, this time is the sum of individual event times—in this case, the 
Vertical and first Surface battalions deploy simultaneously, so the maximum of those two 
is added to the operational pause (driven by limited connector assets) and deployment of 
the second Surface battalion for a total of 35.5 hours.  Deployment closure is achieved at 
194.6 hours, or 8.1 days. 
 
5 Deploy Force Package to Objectives Ashore
5.0 Assault Package Deployment Time (hrs) M1 Sub M1_SubOut_For 35.5
5.0.1 Vertical  Battalion Deployment Times (hrs) M1 VertM1_ 12.36
5.0.2 First Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) M1 Firs M1_ 11.14
5.0.3 Operational Pause/Crew-Rest delay (hrs) M1 DepM1_ 12
5.0.4 Second Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) M1 Sec M1_ 11.14




Example 1 assumed both immediate and sufficient strategic airlift availability to move 
NSDA in a single wave from CONUS to the advance base without delay.  If this is not 
the case, additional time for the deployment can be expected.  In Example 1.1 there is a 
96-hour delay to the start of flights transporting NSDA to the advance base.  Note that 
data element 3A.1.1 in the spreadsheet screenshot that follows now has the value of 96 
hours.  The delay is perhaps the time needed to establish the air bridge from CONUS to 
the advance base.  It is assumed, however, that once airlift begins (at C-day + 96 hours) 
aircraft are available in sufficient quantity for a single wave carrying 20 CH-53s.  This 
example results in overall closure to the objective at 278.6 hours vice the 194.6 hours 





1.0 MPFF SeaState 0
1.1 MPFF preparation time for underway (hrs) 0
1.2 SubOutput: MPFF transit time to SeaBase (NM) 75.0
1.2.1 MPFF transit distance to SeaBase (NM) 1800
1.2.2 MPFF transit speed (kts) 24
1.2.2.1 MPFF Effective Speed 24.0
1.3 Output: Time from deployment order to MPFF arrives SeaBase (hrs) 75.0
2 Troop Movement to AB
2.1 Troop POM delay at CONUS origin (hrs) 0
2.1.1 Number of troops for lift (pax) 8062
2.2 Troops transported to APOE (hrs) 4
2.3 Time to schedule airlift (hrs) 0
2.4 Time sequence for airlift arrival/departure APOE (hrs) 0
2.5 Time to load airlift at APOE (hrs) 4
2.6 SubOutput: Time to fly CONUS to AB (hrs) 11.1
2.6.1 Distance APOE to AB (NM) 6000
2.6.2 Speed APOE to AB (kts) 540
2.7 Output: Time from deployment order until Troops arrive AB 19.1
3 Troop Movement to MPFF Ships
3.0 HSC SeaState 0
3.1 Troops deplane at AB, move to HSC (hrs) 8
3.2 SubOutput: HSC time to AB (post deployment order) (hrs) 0.0
3.2.1 HSC distance to AB at deployment order (NM) 0
3.2.2 HSC  transit speed (kts) 40
3.2.2.1 HSC unladen Effective Speed 40.0
3.3 SubOutput: Troop delay awaiting HSC (hrs) 0.0
3.4 HSC parameters:
3.4.1 Vessel capacity (pax) 1100
3.4.2 Number of vessels (units) 8
3.4.2.1 SubOutput: HSC shuttle required (Yes/No) No
3.5 Troop onload to HSC (hrs) 4
3.6 SubOutput: HSC Transit time AB to SeaBase (hrs) 50.0
3.6.1 HSC transit distance AB to SeaBase (NM) 2000
3.6.2 HSC transit speed (kts) 40
3.6.2.1 HSC burdened Effective Speed 40.0
3.7 SubOutput: Time to move Troops from AB to SeaBase (hrs) 62.0
3.8 Time to transfer Troops from HSC to SeaBase (hrs) 9.95
3.9 SubOutput: Delay of HSC/Troops waiting for MPFF 0.0
3.10 SubOutput: Time to move Troops from AB to MPFF ships (hrs) 72.0
3.11 Output: Total time Deployment Order to Troops close MPFF at SeaBase (hrs) 91.1
3A Non-self deploying aircraft (NSDA) movement CONUS to AB/SeaBase
3A.0 NSDA SeaState 0
3A.1 Time to reposition NSDA at APOE in CONUS (hrs) 12
3A.1.1 Time to assemble airlift 96
3A.2 Time to disassemble NSDA for transport flight to AB (hrs) 36
3A.3 SubOutput: Transport flight time CONUS APOE to AB (hrs) 11.1
3A.3.1 NSDA Transport Distance (NM) 6000
3A.3.2 NSDA Transport Speed (kts) 540
3A.3.3 Airlift time by circulation model (hrs - compute offline) 0
3A.4 SubOutput: Time for NSDA ready for onload HSC (hrs) 191.1
3A.4.1 Reassembly time of NSDA at AB (hrs) 36
3A.4.2 Flight test of NSDA at AB (hrs) 12
3A.4.3 Preparation of NSDA for onload to HSC (hrs) 0
3A.5 NSDA Delay at AB awaiting HSC (hrs) 0.0
3A.5.1 Dedicated HSC available for NSDA? Yes
3A.6 NSDA onload to HSC 0
3A.7 NSDA transit on HSC from AB to MPFF/SeaBase (hrs) 50.0
3A.7.1 Distance (NM) 2000
3A.7.2 HSC burdened speed (kts) 40
3A.7.2.1 HSC NSDA Effective Speed 40.0
3A.8 NSDA transfer from HSC to MPFF (hrs) 2
3A.9 Output: NSDA close at SeaBase (hrs) 243.1
4 Assembly of Force Package
4.1 Mating-up of Troops and unit equipment (hrs) 24
4.2 Output:  Time force package available for transport MPFF to shore (hrs) 115.1
4.3 SubOutput:  Delay awaiting NSDA for foreward movement (hrs) 128.1
5 Deploy Force Package to Objectives Ashore
5.0 Assault Package Deployment Time (hrs) 35.5
5.0.1 Vertical  Battalion Deployment Times (hrs) 12.36
5.0.2 First Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) 11.14
5.0.3 Operational Pause/Crew-Rest delay (hrs) 12
5.0.4 Second Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) 11.14




In this example, NSDA strategic airlift for the 20 CH-53s is delayed 96 hours and, once it 
begins, is limited to four sorties per day.  In this case, closure to the objective is achieved 
at 395.3 hours vice 194.6 hours.  Note that the limited number of connectors, assumed to 
be C-17s in this example, is reflected in the JELO Movement Model.  The output of the 




Number of Cargo/Pax (total units) 20
Number of Connectors (total units) 4
Number of Loading Spots 1





Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of  connectors (McAllister) 2.0
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 25.56
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 2.167
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 1.167
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 11.111
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 11.111
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 5
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 120.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 60.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 1
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 5
Connectors per spot (fully utilized, no queue) 11.79 4.0
Spots required/provided 0.17 4.0
Load offloaded loading cycle 0.17 0.2
Productivity (load/min) 0.00






3A Non-self deploying aircraft (NSDA) movement CONUS to AB/SeaBase
3A.0 NSDA SeaState 0
3A.1 Time to reposition NSDA at APOE in CONUS (hrs) 12
3A.1.1 Time to assemble airlift 96
3A.2 Time to disassemble NSDA for transport flight to AB (hrs) 36
3A.3 SubOutput: Transport flight time CONUS APOE to AB (hrs) 127.8
3A.3.1 NSDA Transport Distance (NM) 6000
3A.3.2 NSDA Transport Speed (kts) 540
3A.3.3 Airlift time by circulation model (hrs - compute offline) 127.78
3A.4 SubOutput: Time for NSDA ready for onload HSC (hrs) 307.8
3A.4.1 Reassembly time of NSDA at AB (hrs) 36
3A.4.2 Flight test of NSDA at AB (hrs) 12
3A.4.3 Preparation of NSDA for onload to HSC (hrs) 0
3A.5 NSDA Delay at AB awaiting HSC (hrs) 0.0
3A.5.1 Dedicated HSC available for NSDA? Yes
3A.6 NSDA onload to HSC 0
3A.7 NSDA transit on HSC from AB to MPFF/SeaBase (hrs) 50.0
3A.7.1 Distance (NM) 2000
3A.7.2 HSC burdened speed (kts) 40
3A.7.2.1 HSC NSDA Effective Speed 40.0
3A.8 NSDA transfer from HSC to MPFF (hrs) 2
3A.9 Output: NSDA close at SeaBase (hrs) 359.8
4 Assembly of Force Package
4.1 Mating-up of Troops and unit equipment (hrs) 24
4.2 Output:  Time force package available for transport MPFF to shore (hrs) 115.1
4.3 SubOutput:  Delay awaiting NSDA for foreward movement (hrs) 244.7
5 Deploy Force Package to Objectives Ashore
5.0 Assault Package Deployment Time (hrs) 35.5
5.0.1 Vertical  Battalion Deployment Times (hrs) 12.36
5.0.2 First Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) 11.14
5.0.3 Operational Pause/Crew-Rest delay (hrs) 12
5.0.4 Second Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) 11.14




In this example, all the conditions of Example 1.2 persist, but it is recognized that in 
addition to the CH-53s, the MEB’s 32 AH/UH tactical helos must also be transported by 
strategic airlift.  These 32 additional helos require 8 additional strategic airlift sorties, and 
are reflected in the Movement Model.  For this example, the ultimate closure time 




Number of Cargo/Pax (total units) 28
Number of Connectors (total units) 4
Number of Loading Spots 1





Equivalent factor (McAllister) 2
eq # of  connectors (McAllister) 2.0
Time per cycle (hrs) (Tc) 25.56
Load time (hrs) (Tl) 2.167
Offload Time (hrs) (To) 1.167
Ingress transit time (hrs) (Tin) 11.111
Egress transit time (hrs) (Tout) 11.111
Time to approach/moor (Ta/m) 5
load rate (min/unit) (Rl) 120.000
discharge rate (min/veh) (Rd) 60.000
cargo/load units per lift (nv) 1
Time to cast-off/clear (Tc/c) 5
Connectors per spot (fully utilized, no queue) 11.79 4.0
Spots required/provided 0.17 4.0
Load offloaded loading cycle 0.17 0.2
Productivity (load/min) 0.00






3A Non-self deploying aircraft (NSDA) movement CONUS to AB/SeaBase
3A.0 NSDA SeaState 0
3A.1 Time to reposition NSDA at APOE in CONUS (hrs) 12
3A.1.1 Time to assemble airlift 96
3A.2 Time to disassemble NSDA for transport flight to AB (hrs) 36
3A.3 SubOutput: Transport flight time CONUS APOE to AB (hrs) 178.9
3A.3.1 NSDA Transport Distance (NM) 6000
3A.3.2 NSDA Transport Speed (kts) 540
3A.3.3 Airlift time by circulation model (hrs - compute offline) 178.9
3A.4 SubOutput: Time for NSDA ready for onload HSC (hrs) 358.9
3A.4.1 Reassembly time of NSDA at AB (hrs) 36
3A.4.2 Flight test of NSDA at AB (hrs) 12
3A.4.3 Preparation of NSDA for onload to HSC (hrs) 0
3A.5 NSDA Delay at AB awaiting HSC (hrs) 0.0
3A.5.1 Dedicated HSC available for NSDA? Yes
3A.6 NSDA onload to HSC 0
3A.7 NSDA transit on HSC from AB to MPFF/SeaBase (hrs) 50.0
3A.7.1 Distance (NM) 2000
3A.7.2 HSC burdened speed (kts) 40
3A.7.2.1 HSC NSDA Effective Speed 40.0
3A.8 NSDA transfer from HSC to MPFF (hrs) 2
3A.9 Output: NSDA close at SeaBase (hrs) 410.9
4 Assembly of Force Package
4.1 Mating-up of Troops and unit equipment (hrs) 24
4.2 Output:  Time force package available for transport MPFF to shore (hrs) 115.1
4.3 SubOutput:  Delay awaiting NSDA for foreward movement (hrs) 295.8
5 Deploy Force Package to Objectives Ashore
5.0 Assault Package Deployment Time (hrs) 35.5
5.0.1 Vertical  Battalion Deployment Times (hrs) 12.36
5.0.2 First Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) 11.14
5.0.3 Operational Pause/Crew-Rest delay (hrs) 12
5.0.4 Second Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) 11.14
5.1 Output: Time to put Troops at objective area - since deployment order (hrs)
 
9.2 Example 2 
 
In this example, rapid strategic lift ships (RSLS) on-load troops, NSDA, and  
non-prepositionable cargo in CONUS and transit directly to the sea base.  As in  
Example 1, the MPF(F) transit directly from their preposition site to the sea base.  When 
both the RSLSs and MPF(F) have arrived at the sea base, the troops transfer from the 












Figure 7.  MPF(F) Direct to Sea Base, RSLSs Utilized 
 
Output from the JELO Flow model for this example is shown in Figure 8.  MPF(F) transit 
is identical to Example 1, again taking 75.0 hours to transit to the sea base.  Troop and 
NSDA movement aboard the RSLSs follows logic similar to the strategic airlift of 
Example 1.  Both troops and NSDA reposition and then load aboard the RSLSs, followed 
by a distance/speed calculation for the voyage to the sea base.  The RSLSs close at the 
sea base after 193.0 hours (eight days), and then transfer of the troops to the MPF(F) 
occurs as described by the JELO movement model (Section 6) in 9.95 hours.  After a  
24-hour period to mate-up with equipment, the troops are ready for onward movement at 
227 hours (9.5 days).  Deployment takes place as previously described (Section 8) and 





1.0 MPFF SeaState M3 MPM3_ 0
1.1 MPFF preparation time for underway (hrs) M3 MPM3_ 0
1.2 SubOutput: MPFF transit time to SeaBase (NM) M3 SuM3_SubOut_MPF 75.0
1.2.1 MPFF transit distance to SeaBase (NM) M3 MPM3_ 1800
1.2.2 MPFF transit speed (kts) M3 MPM3_ 24
1.2.2.1 MPFF Effective Speed M3 MPM3_ 24.0
1.3 Output: Time from deployment order to MPFF arrives SeaBase (hrs) M3 OuM3_Out_time_MPFF_close_SeaBa 75.0
2 Troop Movement to SeaBase via RSLS
2.1 Troop POM delay at CONUS origin (hrs) M3 TroM3_ 0
2.1.1 Number of troops for lift (pax) M3 TroM3_ 8062
2.2 Troop transport to SPOE (hrs) M3 TroM3_ 4
2.3 Time to schedule RSLS (hrs) M3 RSM3_ 0
2.3.1 RSLS available (units) M3 RSM3_ 10
2.4 Time sequence for RSLS arrival/departure SPOE (hrs) M3 RSM3_ 0
2.5 Time to load Troops on RSLS at SPOE (hrs) M3 RSM3_ 4
2.6 Time to reposition NSDA to SPOE in CONUS (hrs) M3 NSM3_ 12
2.7 Preparation of NSDA for onload to RSLS (hrs) M3 NSM3_ 6
2.8 SubOutput: RSLS loaded with Troops/NSDA - ready for departure (hrs) M3 RSM3_RSLS_depart 18
2.9 SubOutput: Time to transit CONUS to SeaBase (hrs) M3 SuM3_SubOut_RSL 175.0
2.9.1 Distance SPOE to SeaBase (NM) M3 RSM3_ 7000
2.9.2 Speed SPOE to SeaBase (kts) M3 RSM3_ 40
2.7 Output: Time from deployment order until Troops arrive SeaBase M3 OuM3_Out_troop_closure_SeaBase 193.0
3 Troop Movement to MPFF Ships
3.0 MPFF SeaState M3 MPM3_ 3
3.1 Delay at SeaBase awaiting MPFF arrival (hrs) M3 TroM3_ 0
3.2 Time to move Troops from RSLS to MPFF ships (hrs) M3 TraM3_ 9.95
3.3 Output: Total time for Troops to close MPFF at SeaBase (hrs) M3 OuM3_Out_total_time_troops_close_S 203.0
4 Assembly of Force Package _
4.1 Mating-up of Troops and unit equipment (hrs) M3 Fo M3_ 24
4.2 Output:  Time force packages available for transport MPFF to shore (hrs) M3 OuM3_Out_ForcePack_time_available 227.0
5 Deploy Force Package to Objectives Ashore _
5.0 Assault Package Deployment Time (hrs) M3 SuM3_SubOut_Forc 35.5
5.0.1 Vertical  Battalion Deployment Times (hrs) M3 VeM3_ 12.36
5.0.2 First Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) M3 Fir M3_ 11.14
5.0.3 Operational Pause/Crew-Rest delay (hrs) M3 DeM3_ 12
5.0.4 Second Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) M3 SeM3_ 11.14
5.1 Output: Time to put Troops at objective area - since deployment order (hrs) M3 OuM3_Out_Assault_troop_closure_Ob
 
Figure 8.  JELO Excel Model, Example 2:  MPF(F) Direct to Sea Base,  
RSLSs Utilized 
 
9.3 Example 3 
 
In this example, forces are still flown to the advance base, but the MPF(F) sails from its 
preposition site to the advance base and thus serves as the connector.  The MPF(F) ships 
would then sail for the sea base as soon as the troops and cargo could be loaded at the 
advance base.  NSDA would still be flown by strategic airlift to the advance base and 
made flight-ready there (see Figure 9).  If they are able to arrive at the advance base 
within a designated waiting period, NSDA could be transported by MPF(F).  If the 
NSDA arrive too late for the MPF(F), they could still be loaded when ready onto HSCs 
for transport to the sea base.  Once within range of the sea base, these aircraft could 



















Figure 9.  MPF(F) Calls at Advance Base En route to Sea Base 
 
The JELO Flow model for Example 3 is shown in Figure 10.  MPF(F) transit is a 
distance/speed event taking 83.3 hours to transit to the advance base (depending,  
of course, on user-specified MPF(F) transit speed and distance from preposition site to 
the advance base).  Troop arrival at the advance base at 19.1 hours, plus their eight-hour 
delay to deplane and move to the MPF(F) loading point, still leaves a 56.2-hour delay 
awaiting the MPF(F) arrival.  This observation argues for the MPF(F) and advance base 
to be collocated.  A 20-hour window for NSDA has been modeled—since the actual 
delay calculates as 23.8 hours, the MPF(F) will sail without embarking the NSDA at the 
advance base.  This max allowable waiting period is, of course, user selectable. 
 
In this example it was again assumed that sufficient strategic airlift for the NSDA is 
available immediately after the deployment order is given—a most convenient 
circumstance.  Nonetheless, the NSDA are not available for load aboard the MPF(F) until 
107.1 hours, so the NSDA will be sealifted by HSC.  Note that the HSC will arrive at the 
sea base at 159.1 hours, while the MPF(F) will not arrive until 170.7 hours.  The HSC’s 
greater speed (40 kts versus 24 kts for the MPF(F)) allows the quicker transit.  In this 
case, it seems likely that the NSDA will fly aboard the MPF(F) prior to arrival at the sea 
base, though no explicit calculation is performed for that event.  Since the troops went 
aboard the MPF(F) at the advance base, there is no mate-up time with equipment.  
Finally, deployment to the ashore objective proceeds as before, and results in a force 





1.0 MPFF SeaState M2 MPFM2_ 0
1.1 MPFF preparation time for underway (hrs) M2 MPFM2_ 0
1.2 SubOutput: MPFF transit time to AB (NM) M2 SubM2_SubOut_MPF 83.3
1.2.1 MPFF transit distance to AB (NM) M2 MPFM2_ 2000
1.2.2 MPFF transit speed (kts) M2 MPFM2_ 24
1.2.2.1 MPFF Effective Speed M2 MPFM2_ 24.0
1.3 Output: Time from deployment order to MPFF arrives AB (hrs) M2 Out M2_Out_time_MPFF_close_AB 83.3
2 Troop Movement to AB
2.1 Troop POM delay at CONUS origin (hrs) M2 TrooM2_ 0
2.1.1 Number of troops for lift (pax) M2 TrooM2_ 8062
2.2 Troops transported to APOE (hrs) M2 TrooM2_ 4
2.3 Time to schedule airlift (hrs) M2 Airli M2_ 0
2.4 Time sequence for airlift arrival/departure APOE (hrs) M2 Airli M2_ 0
2.5 Time to load airlift at APOE (hrs) M2 Airli M2_ 4
2.6 SubOutput: Time to fly CONUS to AB (hrs) M2 SubM2_SubOut_airlif 11.1
2.6.1 Distance APOE to AB (NM) M2 Airli M2_ 6000
2.6.2 Speed APOE to AB (kts) M2 Airli M2_ 540
2.7 Output: Time from deployment order until Troops arrive AB M2 Out M2_Out_troop_closure_AB 19.1
3 Troop Movement to MPFF Ships
3.0 MPFF SeaState M2 HSCM2_ 0
3.1 Troops deplane at AB, move to MPFF (hrs) M2 TrooM2_ 8
3.2 SubOutput: Troop delay awaiting MPFF (hrs) M2 SubM2_SubOut_Troo 56.2
3.3 MPFF parameters:
3.3.1 Vessel capacity (pax) M2 MPFM2_ 1000
3.3.2 Number of vessels (units) M2 MPFM2_ 10
3.3.3 SubOutput: MPFF shuttle required (Yes/No) M2 SubM2_No
3.4 Troop onload to MPFF (hrs) M2 TrooM2_ 4
3.4.1 Max allowable delay awaiting NSDA for lift on MPFF M2 MaxM2_ 20
3.4.2 Actual delay incurred awaiting NSDA for lift on MPFF M2 ActuM2_Actual_delay 0.0
3.5 SubOutput: MPFF Transit time AB to SeaBase (hrs) M2 SubM2_SubOut_MPF 83.3
3.5.1 MPFF transit distance AB to SeaBase (NM) M2 MPFM2_ 2000
3.5.2 MPFF transit speed (kts) M2 MPFM2_ 24
3.5.2.1 MPFF burdened Effective Speed M2 MPFM2_ 24.0
3.6 SubOutput: Time to move Troops from AB to SeaBase (hrs) M2 SubM2_SubOut_time 151.6
3.7 Output: Total time Deployment Order to Troops close MPFF at SeaBase (hrs) M2 Out M2_Out_total_time_troops_close_S 170.7
3A Non-self deploying aircraft (NSDA) movement CONUS to SeaBase
3A.0 NSDA SeaState M2 NSDM2_ 0
3A.1 Time to reposition NSDA at APOE in CONUS (hrs) M2 NSDM2_ 12
3A.2 Time to disassemble/load NSDA for transport flight to AB (hrs) M2 NSDM2_ 36
3A.3 SubOutput: Transport flight time CONUS APOE to AB (hrs) M2 SubM2_SubOut_NSD 11.1
3A.3.1 NSDA Transport Distance (NM) M2 NSDM2_ 6000
3A.3.2 NSDA Transport Speed (kts) M2 NSDM2_ 540
3A.4 SubOutput: Time for NSDA ready for onload MPFF (hrs) M2 SubM2_SubOut_NSD 107.1
3A.5 Reassembly time of NSDA at AB (hrs) M2 NSDM2_ 36
3A.6 Flight test of NSDA at AB (hrs) M2 NSDM2_ 12
3A.7 Preparation of NSDA for onload to MPFF (hrs) M2 NSDM2_ 0
3A.7.1 Potential delay of MPFF awaiting NSDA (hrs) M2 PoteM2_Potential_del 23.8
3A.8 HSC transit time to AB (hrs) M2 NSDM2_NSDA_delay 10.0
3A.8.1 HSC distance to AB at deployment order (NM) M2 HSCM2_ 400
3A.8.2 HSC  transit speed (kts) M2 HSCM2_ 40
3A.8.2.1 HSC unladen Effective Speed M2 HSCM2_ 40.0
3A.9 NSDA onload to HSC M2 NSDM2_ 0
3A.10 NSDA transit on HSC from AB to MPFF/SeaBase (hrs) M2 NSDM2_NSDA_transp 50.0
3A.10.1 Distance (NM) M2 NSDM2_ 2000
3A.10.2 HSC burdened speed (kts) M2 NSDM2_ 40
3A.10.2.1 HSC NSDA Effective Speed M2 NSDM2_ 40.0
3A.11 NSDA transfer from HSC to MPFF (hrs) M2 NSDM2_ 2
3A.12 Earliest NSDA Arrival M2 Ear M2_Earliest_NSD 159.1
3A.12 Output: NSDA close at SeaBase (hrs) M2 Out M2_Out_NSDA_close_SeaBase 170.7
4 Assembly of Force Package
4.1 Mating-up of Troops and unit equipment (hrs) M2 ForcM2_ 0
4.2 Output:  Time force packages available for transport MPFF to shore (hrs) M2 Out M2_Out_ForcePack_time_available 170.7
4.3 SubOutput:  Delay awaiting NSDA (hrs) M2 SubM2_SubOut_Forc 0.0
5 Deploy Force Package to Objectives Ashore
5.0 Assault Package Deployment Time (hrs) M2 SubM2_SubOut_Forc 35.5
5.0.1 Vertical  Battalion Deployment Times (hrs) M2 VertM2_ 12.36
5.0.2 First Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) M2 Firs M2_ 11.14
5.0.3 Operational Pause/Crew-Rest delay (hrs) M2 DepM2_ 12
5.0.4 Second Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) M2 SecM2_ 11.14
5.1 Output: Time to put Troops at objective area - since deployment order (hrs) M2 Out M2_Out_Assault_troop_closure_O
 




In this example, troops and NSDA are transported on RSLSs to the advance base and the 
MPF(F) sails from its preposition site to the advance base and serves as the connector.  
The MPF(F) ships would then sail for the sea base as soon as the troops, NSDA, and 
cargo could be loaded at the advance base (see Figure 11).  Note that the NSDA may be 
















Figure 11.  RSLS and MPF(F) Rendezvous at Advance Base 
 
The JELO Flow model for this example is shown in Figure 12.  MPF(F) transit is a 
distance/speed event taking 83.3 hours to transit to the advance base.  MPF(F) speed is 
input as 24 kts here.  Troops and NSDA arrive at the advance base at 158.0 hours.  They 
debark, move to and load onto the MPF(F) in 12 hours, and then sail to arrive at the  
sea base at 253.3 hours.  Note that there was no delay awaiting the MPF(F) due to the 
RSLSs’ six-day transit to the AB.  Because the troops have been aboard the MPF(F) since 
the advance base, there is no mate-up time with equipment.  Finally, deployment to the 
ashore objective proceeds as before and results in a force closure to objective time of 
288.8 hours (12.0 days). 
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 1 MPFF Transit
1.0 MPFF SeaState M4 MPFM4_ 0
1.1 MPFF preparation time for underway (hrs) M4 MPFM4_ 0
1.2 SubOutput: MPFF transit time to AB (NM) M4 SubM4_SubOut_MPF 83.3
1.2.1 MPFF transit distance to AB (NM) M4 MPFM4_ 2000
1.2.2 MPFF transit speed (kts) M4 MPFM4_ 24
1.2.2.1 MPFF Effective Speed M4 MPFM4_ 24.0
1.3 Output: Time from deployment order to MPFF arrives AB (hrs) M4 Out M4_Out_time_MPFF_close_AB 83.3
2 Troop/NSDA Movement to AB M4
2.1 Troop/NSDA POM delay at CONUS origin (hrs) M4 TrooM4_ 0
2.1.1 Number of troops for lift (pax) M4 TrooM4_ 8062
2.2 Troops/NSDA transported to SPOE (hrs) M4 TrooM4_ 4
2.3 Time to schedule sealift (hrs) M4 Airli M4_ 0
2.4 Time sequence for sealift arrival/departure SPOE (hrs) M4 Airli M4_ 0
2.5 Time to load sealift at SPOE (hrs) M4 Airli M4_ 4
2.6 SubOutput: Time to sail CONUS to AB (hrs) M4 SubM4_SubOut_airlif 150.0
2.6.1 Distance SPOE to AB (NM) M4 Airli M4_ 6000
2.6.2 Speed SPOE to AB (kts) M4 Airli M4_ 40
2.7 Output: Time from deployment order until Troops/NSDA arrive AB M4 Out M4_Out_troop_closure_AB 158.0
3 Troop Movement to MPFF Ships M4
3.0 MPFF SeaState M4 HSCM4_ 0
3.1 Troops/NSDA debark at AB, move to MPFF (hrs) M4 TrooM4_ 8
3.2 SubOutput: Troop/NSDA delay awaiting MPFF (hrs) M4 SubM4_SubOut_Troo 0.0
3.3 MPFF parameters: M4
3.3.1 Vessel capacity (pax) M4 MPFM4_ 1000
3.3.2 Number of vessels (units) M4 MPFM4_ 10
3.3.3 SubOutput: MPFF shuttle required (Yes/No) M4 SubM4_No
3.4 Troop onload to MPFF (hrs) M4 TrooM4_ 4
3.5 SubOutput: MPFF Transit time AB to SeaBase (hrs) M4 SubM4_SubOut_MPF 83.3
3.5.1 MPFF transit distance AB to SeaBase (NM) M4 MPFM4_ 2000
3.5.2 MPFF transit speed (kts) M4 MPFM4_ 24
3.5.2.1 MPFF burdened Effective Speed M4 MPFM4_ 24.0
3.6 SubOutput: Time to move Troops from AB to SeaBase (hrs) M4 SubM4_SubOut_time 95.3
3.7 Output: Total time Deployment Order to Troops close MPFF at SeaBase (hrs) M4 Out M4_Out_total_time_troops_close_S 253.3
4 Assembly of Force Package M4
4.1 Mating-up of Troops and unit equipment (hrs) M4 ForcM4_ 0
_ForcePack_time4.2 Output:  Time force packages available for transport MPFF to shore (hrs) M4 Out M4_Out _availabl
_Ob 288.8
e 253.3
5 Deploy Force Package to Objectives Ashore M4
5.0 Assault Package Deployment Time (hrs) M4 SubM4_SubOut_Forc 35.5
5.0.1 Vertical  Battalion Deployment Times (hrs) M4 VertM4_ 12.36
5.0.2 First Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) M4 Firs M4_ 11.14
5.0.3 Operational Pause/Crew-Rest delay (hrs) M4 DepM4_ 12
5.0.4 Second Surface Battalion Deployment Time (hrs) M4 SecM4_ 11.14
5.1 Output: Time to put Troops at objective area - since deployment order (hrs) M4 Out M4_Out_Assault_troop_closure
 




The few examples demonstrated here are summarized in the table below where AB 
denotes the advance base and SB denotes the sea base.  Time to close to objective varies 
from 8 to 18 days, depending on the closure option selected and other assumptions.  The 
two smallest times to close to objective assume Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircraft 
to transport NSDA are immediately available and in sufficient number, and this is the 
major, and possibly unrealistic, reason their closure times are the smallest.  Example 1 
and its derivatives employ a HSC operating between the advance base and the sea base 
and involve troop transfer at sea.  Examples 2 and 3.1 involve RSLSs operating from 
CONUS—one with at-sea troop transfer and the other without.  At-sea transfer of troops 
to the MPF(F) is avoided entirely if the MPF(F) calls at the advance base to embark 
troops prior to sailing to the sea base, as in Examples 3 and 3.1. 
 
The columns of the table contain only the major features.  There was no variation of the 
large number of parameters of sea-based logistics operations; e.g., geographical 
distances, sea state, and platform characteristics.  Clearly, a plan to evaluate all 
combinations is not sensible.  Rather, the model should be employed to investigate 
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particular conditions and tradeoffs of interest.  The goal in this project was not to conduct 
sea basing platform and capabilities tradeoffs, but to build a tool for doing such analyses.  
The examples illustrated the use of the JELO model, but did not in any sense demonstrate 
a preferred solution. 
 
HSC
To SB To AB No Delay Delay Multi-Wave To SB To AB AB to SB
1 X X X    8.2 days
1.1 X X X   11.6
1.2 X X X X   16.5
1.3 X X X X   18.6 *
2 X X   10.9
3 X X    8.6
3.1 X X   12.0
* additional NSDA






Once the sea-based maneuver elements have been deployed to their objectives ashore, 
attention shifts to sustainment.  The maneuver elements require daily replenishment of 
their provisions, water, fuel, and ammo.  The MPF(F) ships, whose stocks of  
combat stores provide the commodities for the daily resupply of the ground forces, will 
also require replenishment as their stocks are drawn down to the reserve levels.  Finally, 
the other ships of the sea base—the CSG ships and the ESG ships—require 
replenishment periodically. 
 
10.1 Resupply of the Maneuver Forces Ashore 
 
Once ashore, the maneuver forces consume MREs and water daily, along with fuel to 
power their vehicles, generators, and weapon systems, and the ammo used in combat.  
Running out of any of these commodities is a combat stopper.  Daily resupply from the 
MPF(F) ships is intended to replace the commodities used.  If the ground forces deploy 
with two days of supply and the reserve level is one day of supply, the order quantity is 
one day of supply and the safety level is one day of supply.  Deploying with two days of 
supply is suggested in the literature, but deploying with three days of supply and daily 
replenishment of one day of supply results in a safety level of two days of supply.  The 
two days of supply safety level is not modeled, but easily could be. 
 
Daily provisions requirements are easily estimated as three MREs per Marine per day.  
An MRE weighs 1.86 pounds, three of them weigh 5.58 pounds and this then is the 
planning factor for provisions in pounds per Marine per day (PMD) [4].  Water 
requirements are also computed PMD with a planning factor of 4-6 gallons per day.  The 
model uses six gallons PMD and a gallon of water weighs 8.3 pounds.  The planning 
factor for water is thus approximately 50 PMD.  Water could be provided in bulk in  
250-gallon bladders, or in bottled form on pallets.  Palletized bottles are modeled so the 
daily requirement is quoted in pounds rather than gallons.  Use of water bladders requires 
a different load-packaging algorithm. 
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While the daily food and water requirements of the SBME are easily estimated, the daily 
fuel requirement is, along with the daily ammo requirement, much more difficult to 
estimate.  Estimates or planning factors in the literature vary by almost an order of 
magnitude.  Some of the estimates are based on the older Marine Corps Bulletin 3501 
table of organization and table of equipment for a MEB.  The HIMARS and EFSS 
weapon systems are new to the Marine Corps and ammo-planning factors for them are 
not available.  The 2015 MPF(F) and its SBME are new and fuel and ammo planning 
factors have not been published.  The 2015 MPF(F) MEB is different in numbers,  
kinds of units, and table of equipment from the Marine Corps Bulletin 3501 MEB.  The 
published logistics planning factors for the consumption of fuel and ammo are based on 
the 3501 MEB or even earlier versions.  The 2015 MPF(F) MEB SBME is smaller and 
lighter than the 3501 Ground Combat Element (GCF).  Whereas the former has  
500 vehicles of all types, the latter had 1,711 vehicles.  Clearly, the fuel requirements of 
the SBME will be less than the published logistics planning factors for the 3501 GCE.  
Likewise, the SBME has only two artillery batteries rather than an artillery battalion and 
will have smaller ammo requirements than the 3501 GCE. 
 
The methodology adopted for estimating SBME daily fuel and ammo requirements is to 
take the existing planning factors and the existing table of organization personnel 
numbers for each type of unit (infantry battalion, artillery battery, LAV company, etc.) 
and compute the commodity use planning factor in terms of pounds or gallons per Marine 
per day.  These factors are then applied to the SBME table of organization for each of the 
three reinforced infantry battalions and their small number of direct support personnel.  
For example, in [12] an infantry regiment of 2,993 troops is estimated to use  
1,790 gallons of fuel per day (gpd).  This works out to 0.6 gallons per Marine per day 
(GMD).  In [14] a battalion of 1,072 troops was assumed to use 596 gallons per day.  
This works out to 0.56 GMD.  A planning factor of 0.6 GMD was selected and applied to 
the 934 troops of an SBME infantry battalion yielding an estimate of 560 gallons per day.  
GMD fuel-use planning factors for other types of units range up to 12.59 GMD for  
tank companies and 16 GMD for artillery batteries. 
 
The only source of ratios between assault and sustained rates is in [4], and then only for 
fuel.  In [4], the ratios range from 1.5 for infantry to 6.15 for amphibious assault vehicle 
units.  These ratios were used to estimate assault rate fuel use planning factors by type of 
unit.  Summed over the numbers and types of units in the SBME, the estimates of assault 
rate and sustained rate daily fuel requirements of the SBME ashore are 26,500 gallons 
during the assault phase of the operation and 11,300 gallons as the sustained operations 
rate.  Twenty percent of these totals are ascribed to the Vertical battalion and 40% to each 
of the Surface battalions.  This methodology produces smaller daily requirements for fuel 
and ammo than most of the numbers in the literature, but they are perhaps consistent with 
the changes being made to sea base smaller, lighter maneuver forces.  Currently, N42 [5] 
estimates the MEB will use 1,560 bbl or 65,500 gallons of fuel daily.  [4] provides a 
planning factor for the fuel used daily by a Marine division as 113,000 gallons  
(assault rate).  The SBME daily fuel requirement (assault rate) estimate here is  
26,500 gallons.  The SBME certainly has smaller fuel requirements than either a Marine 
division or a full MEB and thus the estimate used here may not be unreasonable. 
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The same methodology was used to estimate daily ammo resupply requirements.  No 
source of assault/sustain ratios was found, so only sustained rates could be estimated.  
The PMD planning factors ranged from 2.51 PMD for infantry to 48.35 PMD for 
artillery.  Applied to the kinds of units, the estimates of daily ammo resupply 
requirements were 7,981 pounds in the Vertical battalion and 14,747 pounds in each of 
the Surface battalions for a daily total ammo resupply requirement of 37,475 pounds, or 
nearly 19 tons. 
 
It is assumed that daily replenishment will be delivered vertically and that surface 
delivery will be used only if the vertical replenishment capability cannot meet all 
requirements.  There will be at least two destinations for the resupply delivery trips:  the 
location of the Vertical battalion and the location of the two Surface battalions.  We 
cannot know the actual geometries, but we do know the desire to keep the sea base well 
out of harm’s way, so the resupply operations are modeled as 110 nm distances from the 
sea base to either destination.  This assumption also allows the daily resupply 
requirements of the different battalions to be merged into a single requirement that is 
conservative in the sense that the actual requirement, as far as distance is concerned, 
could be less demanding. 
 
Doing the arithmetic of 5.58 lbs of MREs PMD and six gallons of water PMD, plus, at 
assault rates, 26,500 gallons of fuel daily and 37,475 lbs of ammo daily, the total daily 
resupply requires the movement of nearly 300,000 pounds of dry cargo and 55 500-gallon 
fuel bladders.  The movement model says this will take 5.9 hours utilizing 10 CH-53Xs 
and 10 MV-22s.  If vertical daily resupply is feasible at assault rates, it will also be 
feasible at sustained rates. 
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Sustainment at 110 NM / 24 MV22 / 10 CH53 / 2 loading spots





Dry Cargo (20k sling) 15 0 3.27 0 1 CH 10 25.3
Fuel Bladder (500g) 55 0 3.27 27 2 MV 8 26.16
Fuel Bladder (500g) 27 3.27 5.9 0 1,2 MV 10 26.3




Crew Day Used # units hrs/unit Total hrs Used
CH 10 8 80 25.3
MV 24 8 192 52.46
Loads Total req CH MV Spots Time CH CD Used MV CD Used
Dry Cargo (20k sling) 15 5 1 6.54 32.7 0
15 10 1 3.27 32.7 0
15 10 2 3.27 32.7 0
Fuel Bladder (500g) 55 8 1 6.83 0 54.64
55 13 2 4.03 0 52.39
27 10 1 2.63 0 26.3
Choices considered for number of CH/MV and Spots per load
 
Sustainment



























10.2 Resupply of the MPF(F) Ships 
 
In the previous section, the daily resupply requirements of the forces ashore were 
estimated.  The food, water, fuel, and ammo are supplied from the stores of the MPF(F) 
ships.  After some time, the levels of these commodities in the MPF(F) ships will fall to 
their reserve levels (50% is assumed for the reserve levels) and the MPF(F) ships will 
themselves require replenishment.  [3] uses a requirement for the MPF(F) squadron to 
have 20 days of supply of all commodities for the MEB.  (It is unclear whether the 
MPF(F) squadron is to contain 20 DOS for the whole MEB or just the Seabased Echelon; 
the whole MEB is not presently seen as embarking the ships of the MPF(F) squadron.)  
This implies that the reserve levels will be reached on the 10th day of operations.  By the 
10th day, the total amount of combat stores supplied from MPF(F) ships would be  
135 tons of MREs, 1,176 tons of water, 265,000 gallons of fuel, and 187 tons of ammo.  
MPF(F) replenishment requirements, however, depend on the cargo capacities of the 
MPF(F) ships for each of the commodities. 
 
The MPF(F) ship implicit in the descriptions here is constrained-size ship with rotary 
wing (R/W) and tiltrotor (T/R) aircraft only from the MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives 
final report [3].  Each of these ships has a cargo fuel capacity of 36,000 barrels.  It is 
assumed that the fuel carried is the standard single fuel, JP-5, that powers both the 
combat vehicles ashore and the aircraft and LCACs of the MPF(F) ships.  If each MPF(F) 
ship has 36,000 bbl of fuel, the squadron of eight ships has 288,000 bbl. of cargo fuel and 
the 50% reserve level will be reached when total consumption reaches 144,000 bbl.  
MPF(F) cargo fuel supports operations of the SBME ashore, MV-22 and CH-53 aircraft 
operations by aircraft of the MPF(F) squadron, and LCAC operations.  Because of the 
deployment of the SBME, first day fuel consumption is larger than that of  
subsequent days. 
 
On the first day of operations, MPF(F) aircraft and LCACs are heavily utilized in the 
deployment of the SBME maneuver forces.  The movement model results in Section 8.1 
predicted 342 MV-22 flight hours and 147 CH-53 flight hours.  A nominal fuel burn rate 
for the MV-22 is 500 gallons per hour.  Likewise, the CH-53 might be expected to burn 
600 gallons per hour.  These numbers imply a total aircraft fuel consumption for 
deployment of 6,171 bbl.  Likewise, the movement model results in Section 8.2 indicate a 
total of 127 LCAC operating hours.  At 1,000 gallons per hour [14], and for deploying 
both Surface battalions, the total LCAC fuel use was 6,048 bbl.  In Section 9.1, the 
SBME assault rate fuel use was 26,500 gallons or 631 bbl.  Thus, the estimate of total 
fuel use on the first day is 12,219 bbl.  For subsequent days, the MV-22 and CH-53 fuel 
uses are associated with resupplying the forces ashore and with supporting other 
operations.  Just half of the aircraft were devoted to resupply operations in the model of 
Section 9.1 and they flew 59.6 MV-22 hours and 25.3 CH-53 hours for a total fuel use of 
45,000 gallons or 1,071 bbl.  We might assume the other half of the aircraft had a similar 
flight hour program, though for other purposes, and therefore the total aircraft fuel use on 
days after deployment is 2142 bbl.  After their heavy use in deploying the two  
Surface battalions, it is assumed that 20 LCAC trips are made daily for a total fuel 
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consumption of 1,300 bbl.  On the other hand, if the MPF(F) ships withdraw to  
75-100 miles offshore, it could be argued that there is no LCAC use at all. 
 
To summarize, total first day fuel use is estimated as 12,219 bbl. and following day fuel 
use totals 4,073 bbl.  The reserve fuel level in the MPF(F) squadron would then be 
reached on the 33rd day of the operations, not the 10th day.  The large amount of cargo 
fuel in this MPF(F) ship design provides for far more than 20 days of supply (more like a 
65-day supply).  Fuel replenishment to the MPF(F) ships could be provided by 
commercial tankers operating skin-to-skin in sea states up to 4, as is commercial practice 
with very large crude carrier operations off the West Coast of the United States. 
 
The constrained-size, rotary wing- and tiltrotor-only design description in [3] does not 
indicate the amount of dry stores and ammo each ship would carry.  Therefore, the  
20 days of supply description is used and, along with a 50% reserve level, implies that 
resupply is needed by day 10 of the operation.  With palletized MREs, bottled water, and 
ammo loaded into containers, and if containers can be transferred from commercial 
container ships at sea in open ocean—either through skin-to-skin transfer or stabilized 
crane—replenishment could be accomplished with commercial ships.  If the time line is 
such that it takes at least ten days to close to the sea base and a day for force assembly, 
the 10th day of operations is 21 days after the deployment order.  This may be sufficient 
time to allow the charter of container ships, their loading, and their transit to the sea base.  
The impact of this, if correct, is that there may not be a requirement for ships dedicated to 
replenishing the MPF(F).  Alternatively, resupply of the MPF(F) could be provided by a 
ship of the squadron being offloaded to the other ships in the squadron and then serving 
as a shuttle ship. 
 
10.3 Resupply of the CSG and ESG Ships of the Sea Base 
 
Exclusive of the submarine, the Navy Fact File describes a carrier strike group as a  
CVN-68 class carrier, a GC-52 class cruiser, two DDG-51 class destroyers, and a  
T-AOE-6 class station ship.  An expeditionary strike group, exclusive of the supporting 
submarine, is described as an LHD or LHA, an LPD, an LSD, a CG-52 class cruiser, a 
DDG-51 class destroyer, and a FFG-7 class frigate [15].  Notably, the ESG has no  
station ship. 
 
Using OPNAV N42 logistics planning factors [5] the following data are compiled. 
 
  Capacity (bbl.) Daily Usage (bbl.) DOS Days to 50% 
CSG F-76 99,392 2,951 33.7 16.8 
 F-44 118,283 5,034 23.5 11.8 
 Ammo (tons) 3,971 100* 39.7 19.9 
      
ESG F-76 115,712 3,348 34.6 17.3 
 F-44 19,306 1,062 18.2 9.1 
 Ammo (tons) 549 36* 15.3 7.6 
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The asterisked numbers require amplification.  The 100 tons of ordnance use by the CSG 
is the lower number in the N42 file.  The lower number may still be too high.  In Vietnam 
the planning factor was 188 tons of strike ordnance per day, in Desert Storm the number 
was a third of this daily tonnage, and the substitution of precision for mass continues 
through OEF and OIF.  The 1,062 bbl. of F-44 is rather larger than the 348 bbl. in the  
N42 file.  The 1,062 bbl. per day represents four flight hours by each of the ESG’s  
12 MV-22s, four flight hours by each of the ESG’s four CH-53s, and a 2.75-hour sortie 
by each of the ESG’s four LCACs.  Finally, the ESG’s 36 tons of ordnance per day is the 
lower of the two numbers in the N42 file. 
 
There is clearly a lot of anxiety over the right planning factors. The analyst using JELO 
can edit any of this as better information becomes available. 
 
The least sustainability arises from the ESG’s limited F-44 capacity, limited ammo 
capacity, and the fact that the ESG has no station ship.  The CSG’s station ship could 
help this situation if it serviced the ESG’s F-44 needs and was loaded with both  
Navy strike ordnance and USMC strike and ground combat ordnance (this is not 
presently the case). 
 
A pencil and paper analysis indicates that two T-AOs and one T-AKE shuttling to and 
from an advance base 2,000 nm distant from the sea base can more than satisfy the fuel 
and ordnance requirements of one CSG and one ESG.  Multiples of the numbers of CSGs 
and ESGs do not scale the requirements linearly, however.  An integer program 
implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) has been used offline 
to evaluate the numbers and types of shuttles required to maintain commodity levels for 
various combinations of CSGs and ESGs, assuming every CSG has a T-AOE station ship 
[16].  The table is presented below. 
 
  Req’d/no F-44 reserve violation Req’d/limited F-44 violation
#CSGs #ESGs T-AKE T-AO T-AKE T-AO 
1 1 1 2 1 1 
1 2 1 2 1 1 
2 2 1 3 1 2 
3 3 1 3 1 2 
4 4 1 4 1 3 




Some of the major logistics issues associated with sea basing expeditionary maneuver 
warfare have been described in this report.  A spreadsheet model of the end-to-end 
process of force closure to the sea base and deployment to objectives ashore has been 
developed.  In all of this there are significant uncertainties about platform specifications 
and capabilities and about logistics planning factors for combat stores usage.  While 
every effort was made to find or develop and use sensible data, almost all model 
parameters may be user specified.  This report contains a number of examples that 
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demonstrate the use of the movement model, the deployment model, and several of the 
possibilities for closing the force to the sea base.  The goal of the project was to create a 
tool to evaluate platform and capability tradeoffs and support programmatic  
decision-making. 
 
Some observations drawn not so much from exercising the model as simply from 
studying the problem are as follows.  A requirement to keep the sea base 100 nm at sea 
because of the sea-skimming missile threat imposes serious difficulties.  Among other 
things, it means that the LCACs and EFVs are disenfranchised unless there is some new 
high-speed assault connector that can carry them closer to shore.  This is a problem at the 
intersection of Sea Shield and Sea Basing. 
 
The issue of moving non-self-deploying aircraft to the sea base is important.  Deployment 
and sustainment don’t take place without them and they may be the last equipment to 
arrive at the sea base.  More generally, where all the connectors—air and surface—are 
when the deployment order is given is an important issue. 
 
It may turn out that for many scenarios, the MPF(F) preposition site is also the nearest 
advance base.  In this case, holding the MPF(F) to wait for the arrival of the troops from 
CONUS may not delay things very much and avoids the need for a HSC and HSC to 
MPF(F) transfer operation.  This may be attractive, but the problem of getting the NSDA 
to the sea base remains. 
 
Finally, while there is much interest in high-speed sealift and high-speed connectors, the 
speed of the MPF(F) ships would seem to be an important variable in the problem.  
MPF(F) speed limits the early arrival of the MPF(F) to the sea base and is even more 
critical if the MPF(F) waits to embark troops at the advance base/preposition site before 
departing for the sea base. 
 
The Navy and Marine Corps are striving to define the MPF(F) and determine what its 
capabilities and capacities need to be.  Additionally, there are potentially other platforms 
to build in order to make Sea Basing a reality—high-speed connectors,  





1. Headquarters Marine Corps, PP&O, Baseline 2015 MEB Table of Organization, 29 
January 2004. 
 
2. Initial Capabilities Document for a HSC for Joint Seabasing Support, Draft Version 
1.0e, 20 April 2004; HSC CONOPS Draft, version 9.1, 4 February 2004; High Speed 
Connectors, draft for signatures of LTG Hanlon and VADM Nathman, undated, but 
after February 2004. 
 
3. MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives Final Summary Report, Center for Naval Analyses, 
CNR D0009814.A2/Final, April 2004. 
 
4. MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual, MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.3, April 2001. 
 
5. OPNAV N42 Excel files: “Approved LPFs icw 04 CLF study.xls,.” undated. 
 
6.  Sea Base CONOPS, N75, 18 March 2004. 
 
7. Major William Hershberger, USMC, Mission Area Analysis, Studies and Analysis, 
MCCDC; August and September 2004 emails; Major Hershberger, a naval aviator, 
was assigned to the MV-22 flight test squadron, HMX-1, from October 2000 until 
September 2003. 
 
8. Rapid Strategic Lift Ship (RSLS), N42 briefing, 8 March 2004. 
 
9. Telecom with Marvin Miller, Underway Replenishment Department, NAVSEA,  
Port Hueneme, 7 September 2004. 
 
10. Pat O’Bryan, MROC Executive Summary: MPFF Capabilities Update and CNA AoA 
IPR Update #3, MCCDC, 17 September 2003. 
 
11. Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift and Super Heavy Lift VTOL, Sikorsky, Vibtech, 
Harley Shipbuilding, and Ocean Dynamics briefing, 21 August 2003. 
 
12. MPF 2010 Ship-to-Shore Movement and Seabased Logistics Support, Volume 1, 
Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 98-19, May 1998. 
 
13. Report of the Task Force on Sea Basing, Defense Science Board, August 2003. 
 
14. LCAC Description, Military Analysis Network, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/lcac.htm. 
 
15. Navy Fact File, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/.www/esg.html. 
 
16. Integer Programming Model by LCDR Eric Morgan, SC, USN, Operational Logistics 
curriculum student, Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, 
September 2004. 
51 
Initial Distribution List 
1. Research Office (Code 09).............................................................................................1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
2. Dudley Knox Library (Code 013)..................................................................................2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5002 
3. Defense Technical Information Center..........................................................................2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
4. Richard Mastowski (Editorial Assistant) .......................................................................2 
Department of Operations Research  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5219 
5. Gregory K. Melchor................................................................................ electronic copy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations N81 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20350-2000 
6. Arthur H. Barber ..................................................................................... electronic copy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations N81B 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20350-2000 
7. VADM William J. Hancock, USN (Ret) ................................................ electronic copy 
5512 Ashleigh Road 
Fairfax, VA  22030 
8. Ms. Robbin Beall .................................................................................... electronic copy 
Office of the Center of Naval Operations 
N816 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20350-2000 
9. CDR Ernest Harden ................................................................................ electronic copy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
N816 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20350-2000 
52 
10. LCDR Phillip Pournelle.......................................................................... electronic copy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
N816B1 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20350-2000 
11. Mr. Jonathan Kaskin ............................................................................... electronic copy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
N42 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20350-2000 
12. Captain James Stewart ............................................................................ electronic copy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
N421 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20350-2000 
13. LCDR Frank Futcher .............................................................................. electronic copy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
N421C 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20350-2000 
14. Captain Arthur S. Mobley....................................................................... electronic copy 
Chief of Staff 
COMNAVSURFGRU PACNORWEST 
15. Commander, Third Fleet......................................................................... electronic copy 
Attn:  Dr. Greg Cox 
16. Nicholas M. Linkowitz ........................................................................... electronic copy 
Logistics Vision & Strategy Center 
HQMC 
2 Navy Annex 
Washington, D.C.  20380-1775 
17. Distinguished Professor David Schrady ................................................. electronic copy 
Operations Research Department 
Naval Postgraduate School 
18. Lecturer Matthew Boensel...................................................................... electronic copy 
Systems Engineering Department 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
53 
